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THE ORIGINS OF FELONY JURY SENTENCING IN THE
UNITED STATES
NANCY J. KING*
Jury discretion to select sentences in felony cases was first
adopted in the United States as part of the 1796 penal code of the
Commonwealth of Virginia. In this code, enacted twenty years after
the state's first constitution, Virginia's legislature replaced capital
punishment for most felony offenses with terms of imprisonment in
the new penitentiary. Felony jury sentencing made its way westward
from the Old Dominion as Virginia-trained lawyers and politicians
moved to Kentucky and revised the criminal law of that state in 1798.
Georgia and Tennessee followed suit in 1816 and 1829, respectively.'
Settlers from these states brought jury sentencing with them when
they populated Arkansas, Missouri, Indiana, Illinois, Texas, and
Oklahoma. Six states today still permit juries to fix sentences in
felony cases.2
All of the states admitted to the Union by 1800 eventually aban-
doned capital punishment for most felonies in favor of discretionary
terms of imprisonment. But of these states, only Virginia, Kentucky,
and Georgia adopted jury sentencing. In 1786, Pennsylvania became
the first state to adopt discretionary terms of hard labor and impris-
onment as the primary punishment for felony offenses-delegating to
judges the authority to select those terms. In 1796, Virginia opted for
jury sentencing, while New York followed Pennsylvania's lead. After
1796, with both Pennsylvania's judge sentencing and Virginia's jury
sentencing models to choose from, New Jersey and all of the remain-
ing eastern seaboard states except Georgia, including Maryland and
the Carolinas, chose judge sentencing.3 This Article explores why,
* Lee S. & Charles A. Speir Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School.
1. See infra app.
2. The six states are Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia. See
Jenia lontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311, 314 n.16 (2003)
(listing state statutes).
3. See infra app.
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despite the Pennsylvania precedent, the lawmakers in Virginia and
Kentucky pioneered what was then, and remains today, an unusual
delegation of sentencing authority.
I. VIRGINIA
The adoption of jury sentencing in felony cases in Virginia was
part of a larger revision of criminal law and procedure that took place
in the Commonwealth during the first two decades of its existence.
This revolution after the Revolution can best be appreciated by
examining those aspects of the new state's criminal process that
prompted penal reform.
A. Before the Reform
We pick up the story in 1794, two years before Virginia's General
Assembly revised the criminal law and established sentencing by
juries in felony cases. Our tour of criminal justice follows a fictitious
felon, John Smith, a white Virginian accused of ending a brawl by
biting off the thumbs of his opponent and stamping on his face with
spiked boots. Such ferocious behavior was all too frequent in the
frontier regions of the Commonwealth.4 At the time, being "hung by
the neck until dead" was the penalty designated for all felonies,
including Smith's crime of mayhem, as well as for larceny and other
property offenses.' But whether the crime charged was a felony or a
misdemeanor, all criminal cases began in the same place-in county
court.
4. See Commonwealth v. Blakeley, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 129 (1800) (upholding conviction of
John Blakely for biting off both of George King's thumbs); Kathryn Preyer, Crime, the Criminal
Law and Reform in Post-Revolutionary Virginia, 1 LAW & HIST. REV. 53, 67 (1983) (discussing
efforts to control maiming and disfigurement in Virginia in the 1700s). Virginia had passed a
statute in 1772 to punish "stamping" in order to deter loggers who would stomp on opponents'
faces with spiked boots, making patterns resembling smallpox sores. See Elliott J. Gorn,
"Gouge and Bite, Pull Hair and Scratch": The Social Significance of Fighting in the Southern
Backcountry, 90 AM. HIST. REV. 18, 19 (1985). As Gorn's fascinating article documents, it was
the specific objective of brawlers during this period to bite off or rip out body parts of their
opponents-primarily eyeballs, ears, lips, tongues, and digits.
5. Act of Nov. 29, 1788, § 1, Oct. 1788 Va. Laws ch. 28, at 15 (clarifying that malicious
maiming and wounding are felonies); Act of Dec. 19, 1792, Oct. 1792 Va. Laws (1 Va. Stat.
(Sheperd)) ch. 68, at 182-84; see also Scutt v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 54 (1817). At
the time, the term "felony" was synonymous with capital punishment. See Barker v. Common-
wealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 122 (1817) (tracing history and use of the term felony in the
Commonwealth from statehood).
[Vol 78:937
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1. Appearance Before the County Magistrate (Justice of the Peace)
After hearing from Smith's accuser, the justice of the peace in
the county where Smith's fight took place would have ordered the
sheriff to arrest and bring Smith before him. These lay justices were
among the wealthiest of the county's population. They selected their
own successors, often their own family members. 6 The office enjoyed
"vast patronage powers, '7 with accompanying opportunities for
corruption. From among their own numbers, magistrates would
choose who would become sheriff, a post prized for its lucrative
potential. One justice could secure another's support for the
"Sherif'alty" or the county clerkship by promising his colleague a
share of the future "proceeds" of the office. These corrupt practices
were held in contempt by the public. Grand jury presentments of this
period reflected the general "decline in deference" for these "local
squires." Several magistrates were charged with failing to fulfill their
judicial duties or with bribery.
8
With county court workloads running twenty cases per day and
higher,9 Smith's appearance before the county magistrate would have
been a summary affair. After hearing from the suspect and wit-
nesses,10 if the magistrate thought the charge against Smith had merit,
he would have enlisted a prosecuting attorney" and called for an
"examining court" to consider the case within ten days.12
6. A.G. ROEBER, FAITHFUL MAGISTRATES AND REPUBLICAN LAWYERS: CREATORS OF
VIRGINIA LEGAL CULTURE, 1680-1810, at 239 (1981); see also F. THORNTON MILLER, JURIES
AND JUDGES VERSUS THE LAW: VIRGINIA'S PROVINCIAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVE, 1783-1828, at
25 (1994). Originally justices had been selected by the governor. VA. CONST. of 1776, ch. II, §
15.
7. ROBERT M. IRELAND, THE COUNTY COURTS IN ANTEBELLUM KENTUCKY 2 (1972).
8. ROEBER, supra note 6, at 160, 174-82, 200; see also Wallace v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2
Va. Cas.) 130 (1818) (refusing to issue a writ of error (and citing analogous cases) in the
prosecution of Wallace, a justice of the peace, who, for "mere malice and evil disposition," had
caused John Hidman "to be put to costs and expenses," had ordered the Sheriff to bring
Hidman before him to answer a complaint by a completely fictitious John Walker, and then had
found Hidman guilty and assessed him costs for the proceeding); Bedinger v. Commonwealth, 7
Va. (3 Call) 461 (1803) (resulting in conviction of justice for buying a vote to the office of clerk
of the court).
9. ROEBER, supra note 6, at 172-73 (noting most of these cases were debt and property
disputes, that caseloads ran as high as 130 cases in a session in one county, and that "the
situation worsened" in the 1790s).
10. Maureen K. Conklin, Power in the Piedmont: Litigation and Political Culture in
Eighteenth-Century Central Virginia 351-59 (1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Wisconsin-Madison) (describing process in Goochland County Court).
11. ROEBER, supra note 6, at 184 (noting the practice of appointing a prosecutor in
misdemeanor cases); Adolph Paul Gratiot, Criminal Justice on the Kentucky Frontier 235
(1952) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania) (on file with the University
of Kentucky Library) (noting it was established practice by the eighteenth century for the
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2. Examining Court
The examining court, or "called" court, was unique in Virginia.
A precharge screening device carried over from colonial practice, 3 it
prevented "unnecessary trips to the capital and expedited justice for
the innocent.' 1 4 This assembly of at least five magistrates would have
gathered at the county seat. Smith would have appeared with coun-
sel, if any, and been offered the opportunity to speak; depositions of
witnesses would have been taken.15 The justices then would have had
three options: (1) acquit Smith of all charges and send him home;16 (2)
imprison him in the county jail to await consideration by the county
grand jury on misdemeanor charges; or (3) order him to be taken to
governor in Virginia to appoint a prosecuting attorney in each county, and that they eventually
became "a permanent part of Virginia officialdom" and "an established practice long before
Kentucky was settled during the last quarter of the same century").
12. Act of Nov. 13,1792, § 1, Oct. 1792 Va. Laws (1 Va. Stat. (Sheperd)) ch. 13, at 20.
13. Conklin, supra note 10, at 351-59.
14. See Peter Charles Hoffer, Introduction to CRIMINAL COURT PROCEEDINGS IN
COLONIAL VIRGINIA: [RECORDS OF] FINES, EXAMINATION OF CRIMINALS, TRIALS OF
SLAVES, ETC., FROM MARCH 1710 [1711] TO [1754] [RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA], at xxxvii
(Peter Charles Hoffer & William B. Scott eds., 1984) (describing examining court); Bradley
Chapin, Felony Law Reform in the Early Republic, CXIII PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 163,
175 (1989). In 1800, the general court held that one could be indicted and tried in district court
for an offense without being first examined for that offense, Commonwealth v. Blakeley, 3 Va.
(1 Va. Cas.) 129 (1800), but the legislature soon passed an act prohibiting this. See Common-
wealth v. M'Caul, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 271, 284 (1812) ("It is certain that this fifth section was
enacted in consequence of a previous decision of the general court, that no examining court was
necessary previous to an indictment for felony. The legislature considered this as an evil, and
they have here provided the remedy .... ") (citing act of Jan. 24, 1804); see also Anonymous, 3
Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 144 (1804):
[T]he district court hath not original jurisdiction to receive and sustain an indictment
for felony, before the indictee hath been examined by a court of justices in the manner
prescribed by law, and that after the said indictee hath been examined before a court
of justices, and sent to the jail of a district court, a new indictment must be filed against
him before his trial in the said court.
15. These were submitted to the district court as part of the record of proceedings because
if testimony was unrecorded, the district court may have been left in doubt as to what offense
was examined. M'Caul, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) at 281-82. These proceedings, like trials, were
crowded with onlookers who were "filled with pre-judgments of the prisoner's guilt or
innocence." A MEMBER OF THE BAR, HINTS ON THREE DEFECTS IN THE CRIMINAL LAWS OF
VIRGINIA 4 (1845) [hereinafter HINTS].
16. According to historian Kathryn Preyer, about one-third of those accused of felonious
conduct were discharged by the examining courts during this period. Preyer, supra note 4, at
75-76 n.82 (noting of 248 persons examined between 1774 and 1795 in ten different counties on
suspicion of felony, eighty-eight were discharged); see also Conklin, supra note 10, at 355-57
(concluding that "justices were loath to risk men's lives over ... property crimes," and noting
that they sometimes imposed a minor penalty after acquittal to insure good behavior by the
accused).
[Vol178:937
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jail at the district court where he would face indictment, trial, and, if
convicted, possible execution.
17
The state's first attorney general personally prosecuted every
felony case during the first several years of the Commonwealth at the
general court in Williamsburg before 1788 when felony jurisdiction
was spread among the eighteen district courts. Without the examin-
ing court, he explained in one case, the power to imprison an accused
in jail far away from home to await trial would have been vested "in a
single justice of the peace, who might be really ignorant of the law,"
and would have been "liable to great abuse," and potentially "a
source of great injustice and oppression." Five justices, on the other
hand, "would probably not be capable of remanding a prisoner for
trial, on light and frivolous grounds, and.., might therefore be
entrusted with the power of committing him to the jail of the general
court for trial.
'18
As important as this "examination" was in protecting the wrong-
fully accused against unjust punishment, it did not protect him from
the nightmare that followed a single magistrate's insistence on the
proceeding itself. Consider the case of John Thilman, accused in 1792
by John Ellis of "feloniously tak[ing] a negro." A magistrate ordered
that Thilman be arrested and jailed. He managed to procure release
on bail, spent "large sums of money in his defence," and was "greatly
injured in his good name, fame and reputation" before he was even-
tually discharged by the examining court. Notably, Virginia law left
his remedy to the civil jury, and he pursued a malicious prosecution
suit against his accuser, Ellis. After years of litigation, Thilman
eventually secured a jury verdict of 120 pounds, only to have it
overturned in 1801 by the court of appeals in Richmond. Alas, his
17. See, e.g., John Bailey's Case, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 258, 261 (1798) (noting that statute
authorizes the examining court "only to do one of three things; viz. to consider, whether as the
case may appear to them the prisoner may be discharged from further prosecution; may be tried
in the county or corporation court, or must be tried by the district court.") (emphasis omitted);
Conklin, supra note 10, at 351-59 (the "examining court" could acquit and release, or send to
general court, or for less serious crime, could require the accused to appear before monthly
county court, which would bind him or her over to be presented by a grand jury or to proceed to
trial before a petit jury).
18. M'Caul, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) at 290. As a judge of the general court had explained:
"[Tihe examining court is an additional barrier erected for the benefit of the ac-
cused .... No innocent man can now be kept in jail more than ten days without a
trial. And if his examining court discharges him, he can never afterwards be ques-
tioned for the same crime, two great privileges which he did not enjoy by the common
law.
Commonwealth v. Myers, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 188, 245 (1811) (quoting Sorrell's Case).
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attorney had erroneously alleged a lack of "just cause" rather than
the want of "probable cause."19
Theoretically, the examining court was to meet within ten days of
the accused's appearance. In practice, however, it was not uncom-
mon for magistrates to fail to show up at these sessions. When the
requisite number of justices failed to appear or key witnesses could
not be found, everyone else was sent home with orders to return
again for another try. The accused waited for the next term of court
in county jail.20  Postponements and cancellations due to nonatten-
dance were frequent between 1790 and 1800. Sessions of county
court were cancelled at least twenty-four times and clerks reported
that many justices were not acting.
21
3. Lesser Offenses: County Grand Juries and Juries
Had the magistrates at Smith's examination concluded that
Smith's behavior constituted a crime less than felony, they would
have bound over the charge to the county grand jury for review at its
next monthly session. The bulk of criminal justice in Virginia was
dispensed in this way, at the county level, with grand jury present-
ments tried before a justice of the peace and a petit jury.
22
Misdemeanors were tried before a jury drawn from freeholders
in the county, unless a change of venue was required due to extreme
19. Ellis v. Thilman, 5 Va. (1 Call) 3 (1801).
20. Many witnesses and jurors were fined during this period for nonattendance. ROEBER,
supra note 6, at 174.
21. Id. at 173-75, 194; see also Commonwealth v. Lovett, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 74 (1817).
Decades later, the situation had not improved. One Virginia attorney colorfully described this
problem:
In the country, nine-tenths of these Courts fail to meet on the special day for which
they are summoned. The witnesses, however, generally attend on that day, and go
home, half heart-sick from their bootless errand, with a small foretaste of the troubles
to come. On the regular county court day, to which, of course, the examination then
stands adjourned, the odds are three to one that a continuance is granted, to the ac-
cused or the commonwealth; or that five justices cannot be got upon the bench, will-
ing to take up and hear the cause-so that it stands over to a second term. The
witnesses again go home, after a detention of perhaps two or more days, muttering
curses against the court, the attorneys and the prosecution. At the second regular
county court, the chances are two to one of another postponement, either formal or
informal. Exeunt again, the grumbling, dispirited witnesses. At the third term, the
case must be heard, or the prisoner discharged, unless one postponement has been at
his instance.
HINTS, supra note 15, at 3 (emphasis omitted).
22. See CRIMINAL COURT PROCEEDINGS IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA, supra note 14, at xxiii;
supra note 17.
[Vol 78:937
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community prejudice.23 The penalty for most misdemeanors was a
fine, although many also carried "stripes" inflicted by the sheriff at
the whipping post near the courthouse or in the public square.24 Some
misdemeanors carried fixed penalties which the judge would simply
pronounce without additional participation from the jury.25 For other
offenses, the legislature authorized a range of punishment. Sentenc-
ing authority in these cases depended upon the type of penalty. In
general, juries fixed fines in their verdicts while judges fixed other
sentences, including any period of incarceration in jail, number of
lashes at the whipping post, or hours languishing in the pillory.26 This
common-law division of authority was not meticulously adhered to by
the General Assembly in enacting penal laws, judging from the
handful of statutes departing from this rule between 1776 and 1796.27
23. For cases discussing change of venue for jury prejudice, see Commonwealth v. M'Cue, 3
Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 137 (1803) (holding that change of venue upon motion of prosecutor was
appropriate in an assault and battery case); Commonwealth v. Bedinger, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 125
(1799). Although the general court later declared in 1817 that change of venue was prohibited,
the option was soon restored by statute. VA. REV. CODE ch. 169, §§ 9, 15 (1819); Common-
wealth v. Wildy, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 69 (1817).
24. See Gratiot, supra note 11, at 265.
25. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Welsh, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 57, 58 (1817) (construing Act of
1792 to require court to impose imprisonment for six months for second conviction of retailing
spirituous liquors, but only after proof that the second offense was committed after conviction
for the first). The penalty for perjury prior to 1789 was the loss of both ears. See Kirtley v.
Deck, 13 Va. (3 Hen. & M.) 388 (1809) (relating that Kirtley allegedly slandered Deck by
accusing him thus: "'Michael Deck has taken a false oath in Rockingham Court.... and I will
have his ears for it[,]' and noting that "the defendant was perhaps not aware of change in the
[punishment]").
26. See, e.g., Oct. 1786 Va. Laws ch. 64, at 42 (providing that "in every... information or
indictment, the amercement which ought to be according to the degree of the fault, and saving
to the offender his contenement, shall be assessed by twelve honest and lawful men"); Act of
Nov. 19, 1789, § 2, Oct. 1789 Va. Laws ch. 8, at 5 (taking girl from parents punishable by any
term not exceeding two years); Act of Nov. 18, 1789, § 1, Oct. 1789 Va. Laws ch. 15, at 11
(providing that possession of false token or counterfeit letter punishable by imprisonment "not
exceeding one year, and setting upon the pillory, as shall be unto him or them limited, adjudged
or appointed by the said court"); Oct. 1786 Va. Laws ch. 49, at 35 (permitting justices to
imprison one guilty of affray for up to one month); Act of Dec. 8, 1788, § 1, Oct. 1788 Va. Laws
ch. 32, at 16 (providing that for incestuous marriages "no punishment by fine shall be imposed
on any person until the same shall have been assessed by a Jury duly impannelled"); see also
J.A.G. DAVIS, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW, WITH AN EXPOSITION OF THE OFFICE AND
AUTHORITY OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE IN VIRGINIA 448-75 (1838); JAMES M. MATTHEWS,
DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, OF A CRIMINAL NATURE, ILLUSTRATED BY JUDICIAL
DECISIONS 85 (2d ed. 1871) (noting that fines are decided by juries, but the jury is not, in a case
of misdemeanor, to ascertain the term of imprisonment because that, at common law, is the
province of the court). Although the jury had no power to determine imprisonment in most
cases, juries' amercements translated into imprisonment for the impecunious who were forced
to work off their fines. See Commonwealth v. Chapman, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 138 (1803). The
court had the option of imposing imprisonment even if a jury failed to impose a fine. See
Commonwealth v. Frye, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 19 (1793).
27. One of the Commonwealth's first statutes declared that the crime of maintaining the
authority of Great Britain will be punished "with fine and imprisonment, to be ascertained by a
HeinOnline  -- 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
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4. District Court: Grand Jury and Jury Trial
If the examining court found that Smith should have been bound
over for mayhem, it would have issued a recognizance for each
witness to appear at the district court on the first day of its next term.
Smith would have remained in the sheriff's custody. The magistrates
also would have ordered the sheriff to summon twelve "good and
lawful men, freeholders... of the neighbourhood of the place where
the [crime] shall have been committed," to make their way to the
district court to serve as trial jurors.28 A jury list would have been
provided to Smith so that he could exercise the twenty peremptory
challenges that he was allocated. 9 For those veniremen summoned to
try Smith, the prospect of traveling from their homes in the western
part of the Commonwealth to the nearest district court would surely
have been unwelcome news. Though the trek to the district court was
an improvement over the situation prior to 1788 when all felony
proceedings took place in Richmond, 0 many jurors and witnesses
continued to be recalcitrant and risk fines rather than endure the
hardship of traveling up to one hundred miles to participate in a
trial.3'
jury, so that the fine exceed not the sum of twenty thousand pounds, nor the imprisonment the
term of five years." Oct. 1776 Va. Laws 15. Although the legislature in 1776 had added that the
act shall "be in force during the present war, and no longer[,]" in 1780 a new act was passed
declaring this offense to be a misdemeanor, again giving to the jury the authority to assess the
fine, and duration of imprisonment, not more than 100,000 pounds weight of crop tobacco, or
five years. May 1780 Va. Laws 25-26. Other acts defined offenses for which the jury in its
discretion would select fine and imprisonment as well. See, e.g., Oct. 1786 Va. Laws ch. 52, at 35
(providing that an officer who takes reward for doing his office other than that allowed by law
shall pay treble damages to the party grieved and "be amerced and imprisoned at the discretion
of a jury") (reenacted, Act of Dec. 19, 1788, § 1, Oct. 1788 Va. Laws ch. 83, at 49); Act of Oct.
19, 1792, § 1, Oct. 1792 Va. Laws (1 Va. Stat. (Sheperd)) ch. 3, at 5; Oct. 1786 Va. Laws ch. 54, at
36 (one who disturbs or arrests minister during service shall be imprisoned and amerced at the
discretion of the jury). Then there was one offense for which judges were given authority to set
any punishment. May 1777 Va. Laws ch. 11, at 18-19 (listing penalty for stealing bill of credit,
or money, as four times restitution or to be sold as a servant for such a term as shall raise the
same, up to seven years, and receiving such other punishment "as the court before whom the
offender shall be convicted shall think adequate to his offence").
28. Act of Nov. 13, 1792, § 4, Oct. 1792 Va. Laws (1 Va. Stat. (Sheperd)) ch. 13, at 21; see
Commonwealth v. Leath, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 151, 155 (1806).
29. See HINTS, supra note 15, at 7 ("One preemptory challenge,-or three, beyond all
question, would most abundantly protect an accused person from the apprehended danger. The
number he now enjoys, enables him almost literally to select his own jury.") (emphasis omitted).
30. See Bedinger v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. (3 Call) 461,470 (1803); Preyer, supra note 4, at
70. The state capitol and the general court moved from Williamsburg to Richmond in 1779. See
Oct. 1777 Va. Laws (9 Va. Stat. (Hening)) ch. 27, at 434 (reporter's note).
31. See HINTS, supra note 15, at 3 (noting that even after the district courts were estab-
lished in 1788, "[t]he hardship and cost of convening all concerned in the trial, at a place distant
perhaps eighty or a hundred miles from their homes... could not be borne"); see also MILLER,
[Vol178:937
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The grand jury of the district court, drawn from residents of the
district court seat,32 would consider Smith's case, including the record
of the examining court proceedings. 3 If the defendant was indicted,
ideally his trial would follow immediately in the same term of court.
But because of missing witnesses, the accused would often have to
await the next term of court in the jail of the district court,34 a place
where criminals, debtors, runaway slaves, and those detained for trial
were jammed together, "'their Situation highly uncomfortable and
unwholesome"' according to one grand jury commenting on its local
gaol.
35
Delinquent veniremen also delayed trial after trial. The true
story of the attempt to bring Abner Vance to justice for murder
illustrates the difficulty of securing a functioning jury. By the time
the ordeal of jury selection began, Vance had already been tried once,
and had his conviction overturned. From the twelve summoned to
serve as jurors in his second trial, only a partial jury could be gleaned,
so the sheriff was directed to summon another forty-eight bystanders
supra note 6, at 27 ("[Tihe districts were made up of geographical areas usually consisting of
four or five counties.").
32. See Act of Nov. 29, 1792, § 1, Oct. 1792 Va. Laws (1 Va. Stat. (Sheperd)) ch. 12, at 17
(providing that "the sheriff of each county, where a district court is appointed to be holden, shall
before every meeting of such court, summon twenty-four of the most discreet freeholders of the
district" to be supplemented with "bystanding freeholders[,]" as necessary, to form the grand
jury).
33. See Commonwealth v. M'Caul, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 271, 278 (1812) (noting clerk was
responsible for creating record in examining courts). The record was brief and served to specify
the offense for which the defendant had been bound over. In Commonwealth v. Leath, 3 Va. (1
Va. Cas.) 151 (1806), when reviewing issues raised by a motion to arrest judgment made prior to
the imposition of a sentence following conviction and sentencing by jury for several stabbings,
the general court found, based on the examining court record, that the prisoners had been duly
examined for all of the offenses of conviction. The entire record read:
At a called court held for the town of Petersburg at the court-house on the said Tues-
day, 26th February, 1805, for the examination of Peter Leath and Heartwell Leath on
suspicion of felony, present Paul Nash, mayor (also the recorder and four alderman by
name.) The said Peter Leath and Heartwell Leath being brought to the bar in custody
of the serjeant of this town, to whose charge for the aforesaid cause they had been
committed, and upon examination, divers witnesses being sworn and examined on the
premises, and the prisoners not having any thing to say in their own defence, on con-
sideration it is the unanimous opinion of the court that the said Peter Leath and
Heartwell Leath should be tried for the said supposed offence at the next District
Court to be held in Petersburg the 15th April next, and thereupon they are remanded
to jail.
Id. at 152-53.
34. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kearns, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 109 (1794) (explaining that the
defendant was indicted in district court in April 1793, but trial could not be had until April 1794
because the witnesses summoned for the Commonwealth could not be procured for the earlier
term).
35. ROEBER, supra note 6, at 215 (quoting FREDERICKSBURG DiSmR ORDERS, 1789-
1805, Sept. 30, 1797).
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to appear for jury service the next day.36 This effort produced only
seventeen more veniremen, however, prompting the court to com-
mand the sheriff to round up another forty-eight candidates. As the
term came to a close, the court gave up-the defendant had thirteen
peremptory challenges remaining and only seven jurors had been
selected. At its next session months later, the court tried for a third
time to bring Vance to trial, but watched its last hope of impaneling a
jury fade away when three days of retrieval work by the sheriff
yielded only three seated jurors. The case was then moved to another
circuit, where Vance was finally convicted and sentenced to hang.
37
Assuming twelve jurors would have eventually been selected in
Smith's trial, his chances for acquittal at trial would have been high.
38
A number of the jurors probably would have been bystanders "whose
hearts or heads [were] so soft as to make it easy for an ingenious or
eloquent advocate to [have] influence[d] into them the doubt.. ." or
they may have been "friends" of the defendant who had managed to
"station themselves conspicuously before the sheriff's eyes. ' 39 When
an acquittal was not forthcoming, a new trial often was. Jurors who
could not agree were "confined during the full legal term of [the]
36. See Act of Nov. 29, 1792, § 11, Oct. 1792 Va. Laws (1 Va. Stat. (Sheperd)) ch. 12, at 19
(authorizing sheriff, "every day the court sits, [to] summon a sufficient number of bystanders...
to attend the court that day, that out of them may be impannelled sufficient juries for the trial of
causes depending in such courts"); Act of Nov. 13, 1792, § 4, Oct. 1792 Va. Laws (1 Va. Stat.
(Sheperd)) ch. 13, at 21 (noting that sheriff may summon as many bystanders as needed to make
a jury of twelve, and that all twelve may be bystanders).
37. Vance v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 162 (1819) (upholding judgment).
Consider also Gibson v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 111 (1817), where the general court
approved the use of two sets of summonses to get up a jury when the bystanders ran out. In
Gibson, after challenges, the jurors, together with the bystanders, among them "Attorneys,
practising in the court," fell short of the requisite twelve, so that those "who had been elected
and sworn, were adjourned in the attendance of the Sheriff, till the next day, and charged not to
separate" or communicate with themselves or others. Id. at 115-16. The sheriff that night
summoned, from their homes miles from the courthouse, several additional potential jurors, and
after more challenges, "at length" a jury was formed. Id. at 115. The legislature was moved to
provide-as an incentive to public duty as well as protection for the accused-that whenever
court participants were not able to assemble and hear a criminal case for three consecutive
terms, the accused would be freed. Oct. 1777 Va. Laws (9 Va. Stat. (Hening)) ch. 17, § 54, at
414; VA. REV. CODE ch. 169, § 28 (1819).
38. In Richmond, it was more likely that he would be acquitted than convicted. Robert M.
Saunders, Crime and Punishment in Early National America: Richmond, Virginia, 1784-1820, 86
VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 33, 41 (1978) (noting that from 1784-1820 the conviction rate
for men was only 43%).
39. HINTS, supra note 15, at 5 (complaining that "[s]ometimes the whole jury is composed
of these ductile materials"); see also Commonwealth v. Chapman, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 138 (1803)
(explaining that jury convicted and fined defendant $450 for bribing the deputy sheriff to
summon those named by the defendant); ROEBER, supra note 6, at 214 n.24 (noting complaint
that dangerous felons were acquitted by idle, less-educated bystanders).
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court" until they either reached a verdict or were discharged.
40
Individual jurors were allowed to separate only in the constant
company of a deputy. This rule proved fortuitous for one John
M'Caul, convicted of stealing the meaningful sum of $17,000 from the
Commonwealth's own treasury. He was freed after it was learned
that one of his jurors, allowed to visit a sick child at home for twenty
minutes, had been permitted by his escort to "go upstairs to see his
family" for five minutes unaccompanied.
41
If the jury agreed that Smith had committed mayhem, its verdict,
complete with the command that he be "hung by the neck until
dead," would have been announced and Smith would have been
promptly whisked back to jail. Called before the district judges the
next day and asked if there was any reason sentence of death should
not be passed upon him, Smith still would have had three cards left to
play before resigning himself to execution.
5. "Adjournment for Difficulty" to the General Court
First, relief remained a possibility from the general court, the
Commonwealth's highest criminal tribunal. There was no appeal as
of right in criminal cases, but a charge could be considered by the
high court after being "adjourned for difficulty" to the general court
by the judges of the lower courts. Smith could have hoped that the
district court judges would agree with him that his case involved a
question of law so confounding as to require the attention of the
general court, and that they would arrest judgment until that question
was resolved at the next sitting of the high court.4 2 For example, one
fortunate soul, Preeson Richards, escaped the hangman when the
general court agreed to set aside his conviction for burglary because
the indictment stated only that the grand jury was of the district of
Accomack and Northampton, and that the offense was committed in
the county of Northampton. It should have alleged, in addition,
explained the learned jurists, that the burglary was "committed...
40. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 319 (1813).
41. Commonwealth v. M'Caul, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 271, 304-06 (1812).
42. Commonwealth v. Proctor, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 4 (1791) (general court concluded that
offense charged in indictment was not a crime, after convicted defendant had moved for arrest
of judgment in district court, and case had been adjourned for difficulty to general court);
Commonwealth v. Dowdall, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 7 (1791) (overruling plea in arrest of judgment in
case where defendant "being brought up to receive the sentence of the court, .. . tendered" his
arguments in arrest of judgment).
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within the district composed of the counties of Accomack and North-
ampton."
43
6. Sentencing and Benefit of Clergy
If Smith failed to identify a legal issue that stumped the district
court judges, his next option would have been to ask for benefit of
clergy. Clergy was a judicial pardon of sorts, adopted throughout the
colonies along with other aspects of seventeenth-century English
criminal justice. A description of the practice in the general court just
prior to the establishment of the district courts illustrates well its
major features. After being granted the privilege, the "jailer, 'in open
court,' branded [the defendant] on the 'Brawn of the left Thumb.' If
the conviction was for a homicide other than wilful murder.., he was
branded with the letter M. For all other felonies it seems that the
letter T was customary." 44 This mark would prevent the culprit from
claiming the privilege a second time, guaranteeing that his sentence
for a second offense would be death. By 1774, "branding" with a cold
iron was "habitual practice," prompting the author of a leading
treatise on the justices of the peace in Virginia to remark:
[Tihe burning in the Hand seems to be of little Use, and ... can
scarcely be called even so much as a slight Punishment, but rather a
piece of absurd Pageantry, tending neither to the Reformation of
the Offender, nor for Example to others; to wit, burning the Of-
fender in the Hand with an Iron scarcely heated.
45
Historians estimate that up to a third of all felons in Virginia dur-
ing this time were granted clergy.46 Property offenders, and women,
in particular, were clergied and thus spared execution.47 The life or
death decision to extend clergy was not the jury's to make. Rather,
43. Commonwealth v. Richards, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 1 (1789). Not surprisingly, decisions
like these prompted the legislature in 1804 to prohibit the reversal of convictions following jury
verdicts for minor indictment defects. Act of Jan. 24, 1804, § 6, Dec. 1803 Va. Laws ch. 95, at 63.
44. Hugh F. Rankin, Criminal Trial Proceedings in the Federal Court of Colonial Virginia,
72 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 50, 67 (1964); see also Act of Nov. 27, 1789, Oct. 1789 Va.
Laws ch. 22, at 14-15 (codifying benefit of clergy and listing crimes for which clergy was
unavailable, including murder, burglary, arson, and horse theft).
45. Id. (quoting RICHARD STARKE, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF
PEACE EXPLAINED AND DIGESTED, UNDER PROPER TITLES 87-88 (1774)).
46. Jeffrey K. Sawyer, "Benefit of Clergy" in Maryland and Virginia, 34 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 49, 59 (1990).
47. Tracing 147 felony defendants from 1789 to 1800, Kathryn Preyer found that, of the 41
convicted, 24 were clergied, while only 17 were sentenced to be hanged. Preyer, supra note 4, at
71. Given the absence of case reports at the time, it is not surprising that district judges did not
agree which offenses were clergyable and which were not. See Commonwealth v. Stewart, 3 Va.
(1 Va. Cas.) 114, 115 (1795).
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the discretion to spare a convicted felon's life and to impose the more
lenient sentence was unbounded, and belonged entirely to the court.
Judges were also granted the discretion to order restitution for
robbery and larceny. 8
7. Pardon: The Felon's Last Resort
Smith, if denied clergy, would have had one last resort: the gov-
ernor's pardon. The frequency with which felons were pardoned may
be surprising to those familiar with modern clemency practices.
Pardon and benefit of clergy were alternative ameliorative features of
what was otherwise a horribly draconian penal system.49 For exam-
ple, when horse thievery was made unclergyable in 1789, and the
penalty of death extended to accessories to the crime in 1792, pardons
for horse stealing increased dramatically. 0 "[S]carce a single horse-
stealer suffered death," so many were pardoned.
51
8. The Need for Reform
Given the opportunities for derailment along the way, only an
unusual case ended in execution. Three separate proceedings-
examining court, grand jury, and jury trial-had to be negotiated
successfully by the complaining witness, the sheriff, and the prosecut-
ing attorney. Dozens of participants-the jurors, the witnesses,
several judges, the prosecutor, and the accused-were required to
travel to distant locations. At each stage, the accused could entertain
real hope of avoiding punishment. It is therefore not surprising that
in this period citizens with legitimate complaints of criminality
preferred to take matters into their own hands. One man complained
in 1783 that to travel 140 miles in order to testify against a man he
suspected of stealing his horse would double the amount of the loss,
and he preferred to let the matter go. 2 Historian Kathryn Preyer
concluded in her study of criminal justice in Virginia at this time that
trial in felony court was reserved for only the "most threatening
suspects. ""
48. Act of Dec. 12,1792, § 1, Oct. 1792 Va. Laws ch. 14, at 43.
49. See generally Sawyer, supra note 46.
50. Preyer, supra note 4, at 73-74.
.51. WILLIAM BRADFORD, AN ENQUIRY How FAR THE PUNISHMENT OF DEATH IS
NECESSARY IN PENNSYLVANIA 62 (1793) (discussing Virginia), reprinted in 12 AM J. LEGAL
HIST. 122, 167 (1968).
52. Preyer, supra note 4, at 81-82 n.104.
53. Id. at 81-84.
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In sum, during the decades immediately following independence,
sentencing in Virginia was a joint effort, a cumulation of several
sequential decisions by a series of judges, juries, and elected officials.
State legislators first specified the permissible penalties for a given
offense as well as whether those penalties were mandatory or discre-
tionary. The county justices of the peace, the grand jurors in district
court, and finally the district court trial jury each had the opportunity
to reject all charges, or to select a lesser offense carrying a different
penalty. Following conviction for a felony, the district judge decided
whether the offender would hang or would receive benefit of clergy.
Finally, the clemency power of the governor determined the actual
punishment suffered by a large proportion of the condemned. Very
few were ever executed. By 1796, legislators were dissatisfied with
this uneven, ineffective, and arbitrary system of crime control, and
were ready for something new. They were soon to conclude that the
answer was to make punishment more certain, which could in turn
only be accomplished by ameliorating the harsh penalty of death for
so many crimes and substituting penalties that judges, juries, and
governors could consistently enforce.
B. Jefferson's Early Reform Efforts
Before examining the act of 1796 that eventually substituted dis-
cretionary terms of imprisonment as punishment for most felonies, it
is important to review previous failed attempts at reform. The very
first General Assembly in 1776 had commissioned a Committee of
Revisors-Thomas Jefferson, George Wythe, George Mason, Tho-
mas Lee, and Edmund Pendleton -to draft the laws of the Common-
wealth, including a revised criminal code.54 The Committee met in
Fredericksburg in January of 1777, Jefferson was asked to draft a
code of criminal law, and by 1779, a revised code had been submitted
to the General Assembly.
55
Jefferson's proposed reforms would have stripped Virginia's dis-
trict court judges of the sentencing authority that they had previously
enjoyed in felony cases by granting or withholding clergy. "Let mercy
be the character of the law-giver, but let the judge be a mere ma-
chine," Jefferson had reportedly written earlier in 1776.56 The pro-
54. See 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 43 (H.A. Washington ed., 1861)
[hereinafter, JEFFERSON WRITINGS]; Preyer, supra note 4, at 53-85.
55. The bill is reprinted in 1 JEFFERSON WRITINGS, supra note 54, at 147-62.
56. See Preyer, supra note 4, at 62.
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posed bill would have eliminated the hope of either clergy or pardon,
so "that none may be induced to injure through hope of impunity.
'57
As a substitute for hanging, clergy, and pardon, Jefferson proposed a
veritable encyclopedia of eighteenth-century punishment. Specified
and mandatory terms of "hard labor at public works" were designated
as punishment for manslaughter and property crimes."' All death
sentences for murder and treason were to be carried out within two
days of sentencing, and the body of one who murdered a family
member or committed petty treason would after hanging "be deliv-
ered to Anatomists to be dissected."59 Murderers who used poison
would be poisoned to death. 60 Gibbeting was reserved for dueling.
61
Except for those committing murder by duel, each murderer forfeited
at least half of his estate to the estate of the person slain. 62 Rapists
suffered castration.63 A woman guilty of polygamy or sodomy would
have a half inch hole cut "through the cartilage of her nose."64 Lex
talionis would have been the penalty for our man Smith-he would
have lost his own thumbs for his crime of biting off those of his
victim. 65 The bill did not speak to misdemeanors, as it was limited to
"proportioning Crimes and Punishments, in cases heretofore
Capital."66
Notably, whenever the penalty for an offense in Jefferson's pro-
posed code was discretionary, as it was for just two offenses, the jury,
not the judge, was granted the authority to determine punishment.
57. 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 237 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1904) (cited
in RONALD J. PESTRIrO, FOUNDING THE CRIMINAL LAW: PUNISHMENT AND POLITICAL
THOUGHT IN THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA 51 n.27 (2000)).
58. Counterfeiting carried six years' hard labor in the public works and forfeiture of all
lands and goods; arson five years and triple restitution; burglary and robbery, four years and
"double reparation"; horse stealing and housebreaking carried three years and restitution;
grand larceny was punished with two years and restitution; petit larceny one year and repara-
tion. 1 JEFFERSON WRITINGS, supra note 54, at 147-62.
59. Id. at 148-50.
60. Id. at 150.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 153-54.
64. Id. Gail McKnight Beckman explained:
The last penalty seems meaningless until one reflects that in ancient Egypt a similar
punishment was intended to prevent the female from further alluring the male into
wantonness by the attraction of her nose. This illustrates how extensive Jefferson's
knowledge of early laws was and from how many sources he was influenced.
Gail McKnight Beckman, Three Penal Codes Compared, 10 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 148, 153 (1966)
(footnote omitted).
65. See 1 JEFFERSON WRITINGS, supra note 54, at 154.
66. Id. at 147.
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The exercise of the "pretended arts of witchcraft ... or sorcery"
meant "ducking and whipping, at the discretion of a jury, not exceed-
ing fifteen stripes. '67 And if our Mr. Smith had been convicted of
mayhem and had already lacked thumbs, "some other part of at least
equal value and estimation, in the opinion of a jury," would be
"maimed, or disfigured in like sort" instead.68
The bill, along with the rest of the proposed revisal of Virginia's
laws, was submitted by the Committee of Revisors in 1779, but was
tabled after its submission for reasons unknown.69 Not until Decem-
ber 1785 was it reintroduced, this time by James Madison, who
shepherded the bill in the Assembly while Jefferson was in France. 0
It received a "respectful hearing" but was finally defeated by a single
vote the week before Christmas, 1786.
71
Historians have advanced a number of explanations for the fail-
ure of Jefferson's penal reform bill.72 The first is reflected in Madi-
son's letter to Jefferson reporting on the bill's demise. There he
states that the Assembly considered the lenient treatment of horse
thieves to have gone "too much against the mood of the time" causing
the bill to fail due to "rage against horse stealers. ' 73 Jefferson himself
later attributed the loss to the fact that the "reasonable world" had
been satisfied with the propriety of substituting "hard labor on roads,
canals and other public works" for capital punishment, "but the
general idea of our country had not yet advanced to that point.
'74
Indeed, the legislature in the next five-year period exhibited not
leniency but greater severity in its acts pertaining to crime, by remov-
67. Id. at 160 (emphasis added).
68. See id. at 154-55 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
69. Charles T. Cullen, Completing the Revisal of the Laws in Post-Revolutionary Virginia,
82 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 84 (1974). The bill may have been tabled in 1779 due to the
threat of war. Id. at 98 ("The war had distracted the attention of the legislature when the first
report was submitted in 1779 ... ").
70. Chapin, supra note 14, at 173; Cullen, supra note 69, at 85.
71. PAUL W. KEVE, THF HISTORY OF CORRECTIONS IN VIRGINIA 15 (1986) (the bill was
"'[tiwice introduced, debated at length"'); see also Chapin, supra note 14, at 176 (noting that the
failure of the bill was a considerable disappointment to Jefferson, for he had put great effort
into it, with wide-ranging research of the philosophical literature on the subject).
72. Historian Kathryn Preyer reports:
Legislative records for the period do not report debates. Newspapers which have
been examined make no mention of the subject. Searches in unpublished letters of
members of the assembly have produced nothing. Legislative and executive materi-
als, both printed and unpublished, have shed no light on this bill.
Preyer, supra note 4, at 70 n.65.
73. KEVE, supra note 71, at 15; Preyer, supra note 4, at 69.
74. 1 JEFFERSON WRITINGS, supra note 54, at 45 (autobiography).
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ing the possibility of clergy for horse theft and several other of-
fenses."
Alternatively, opposition to Jefferson's proposals could have fo-
cused on the more extreme corporal punishments required under the
bill. Jefferson himself feared as much. In his letter presenting the bill
to George Wythe, he wrote that the
Lex talionis, although a restitution of the Common law, to the sim-
plicity of which we have generally found it so advantageous to re-
turn, will be revolting to the humanized feelings of modern times.
An eye for an eye, and a hand for a hand, will exhibit spectacles in
execution whose moral effect would be questionable; and even [cas-
tration], although long authorized by our law, for the same offence
in a slave has, you know, been not long since repealed, in confor-
mity with public sentiment. This needs reconsideration.
76
He later wrote in his autobiography that when the Committee
had first met:
On the subject of the Criminal law, all were agreed, that the
punishment of death should be abolished, except for treason and
murder; and that, for other felonies, should be substituted hard la-
bor in the public works, and in some cases, the Lex talionis. How
this last revolting principle came to obtain our approbation I do not
remember.... [T]he modern mind had left it far in the rear of its
advances.77
Even if the corporal punishments in the bill had been acceptable, the
provisions for forfeiture of estate or the elimination of pardon may
have been objectionable at the time.
Another explanation, not inconsistent with others, has been ad-
vanced by historian Bradley Chapin. The penal bill was considered at
the same time as another bill to restructure and reform the county
court system, also originating with Jefferson's committee and cham-
pioned during the same legislative session by Madison. This proposal
to create assize courts was perceived by magistrates as a threat to
their control over the legal and economic affairs of counties,7 8 and
would have "transferred the prosecution of felons to local grand
75. Preyer, supra note 4, at 73; see, e.g., Act of Nov. 18, 1789, Oct. 1789 Va. Laws ch. 11, at
6 (providing that intercourse with child under ten shall be felony without allowance of clergy);
Act of Nov. 25, 1789, Oct. 1789 Va. Laws ch. 19, at 13 (providing forgers "shall be deemed guilty
of felony, and suffer death as a felon without benefit of clergy."); Act of Nov. 27, 1789, § 1, Oct.
1789 Va. Laws ch. 22, at 14 (removing benefit of clergy for murder, burglary, arson, larceny
from a church, robbery, and horse stealing).
76. 1 JEFFERSON WRITINGS, supra note 54, at 146-47 (Jefferson's Letter to George Wythe,
Nov. 1, 1778, enclos.ing bill).
77. Id. at 43-44; see also KEVE, supra note 71, at 14.
78. ROEBER, supra note 6, at 192 n.66.
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juries supervised by judges of the General Court on circuit. '79
Because both this court reform bill and the penal reform bill threat-
ened local judicial power in one way or another, those who had an
interest in preserving the status quo may have rallied their forces to
prevent either bill from passing.
Chapin also notes that the bill may have been regarded as a vio-
lation of the legislature's command to the revisors that the committee
was not to meddle with the common law except where necessary. 80
Yet another possibility is that the cost of building a penitentiary was
more than lawmakers wanted to bear at the time. These start-up
costs deterred penal reform in other southern states for years," and
they could have played a role in Virginia's reluctance as well.
After Jefferson's bill died in 1786, penal reform activity in Vir-
ginia lapsed again for nearly a decade, while the reform movement in
other states accelerated. A brief detour from our examination of
Virginia sentencing reform to events in the state of Pennsylvania will
provide both context for and contrast to later events in Virginia.
C. Reform Succeeds in Pennsylvania
In 1786, the same year that Virginia rejected penal reform, Penn-
sylvania embraced it. Supported by a coalition of Quakers, enlight-
ened reformers, and those seeking more effective crime control,
Pennsylvania's revised criminal code of 1786 substituted imprison-
ment and hard labor for execution for all felonies except murder and
treason.82 However, the Pennsylvania statutes as enacted did not
include mandatory sentences like those proposed by Jefferson. The
new Pennsylvania scheme instead included a penalty range for each
offense with the maximum sentence at ten years, 83 and vested judges
79. Chapin, supra note 14, at 175-76; see also MILLER, supra note 6, at 25-26 (discussing
opposition to Madison's court reforms by "[Patrick] Henry's faction"); ROEBER, supra note 6,
at 192-93 (describing Madison's bill to reform county courts and arguing that its defeat was
orchestrated by "county court partisans").
80. Chapin, supra note 14, at 175.
81. See, e.g., Jack Kenney Williams, Crime and Punishment in South Carolina, 1790-1860,
at 298 (1953) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University) (on file with Emory
University Library).
82. Act of Sept. 15, 1786, ch. 1241, 12 Pa. Stat. 280 (Harrisburg Pub. Co. 1906).
83. New York's penal reform in 1796 fixed fourteen years as the maximum term for all first
offenses above the grade of petty larceny. ORLANDO F. LEWIS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
AMERICAN PRISONS AND PRISON CUSTOMS, 1776-1845, at 51 (1922). Life expectancy at the
turn of the century was about thirty-five years, so that a fourteen-year sentence was essentially a
life sentence for anyone over 18. See 4 DICrIONARY OF AMERICAN HISTORY 150 (rev. ed.
1976) (noting life expectancy for males in Massachusetts in 1789 at 34.5 years and in 1855 at 38.7
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with the power to fix sentences within those limits and also to pardon
prisoners who had evidenced "sincere reformation." 84 The bill was
controversial, and the provision granting to judges the authority to
choose the term of punishment was the main point of contention.
The debate over the Pennsylvania bill is worth examining in
some detail, for it is eerily similar to the debates today about judge or
jury sentencing, over two centuries later. The question whether juries
or judges should have primary sentencing authority was far from
settled in Pennsylvania when the bill was proposed. Indeed, there
were three contenders for sentencing power: juries, judges, and the
Executive Council, which exercised the power of pardon. Informa-
tion about this controversy comes from two sources. First, criticism of
the bill appears in the published essays of Francis Hopkinson, a
Republican lawyer and long-time political enemy of the bill's most
prominent supporter and rumored codrafter, Thomas McKean.
85
McKean was associated with the Constitutionalist party and was then
serving as Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The
second source of information on the bill is the debate on the bill on
the floor of the legislature, reported in Philadelphia's daily newspa-
per, The Pennsylvania Packet.
Hopkinson wrote for the Packet in April of 1786 under the name
"Jus" to warn Pennsylvanians of the bill's dangerous delegation of
sentencing power to judges. Penalties should be definite and certain,
he argued-if they were not, the discretion to select the sentence
must rest with juries. His objections to judicial sentencing included:
arbitrariness ("The quantum, at least, is to be determined by the
particular state of mind the judge happens to be in at the time of
passing sentence. Vexations and disappointments may fend his
honour to court in a very ill humour, and then wo to the culprits.");
years). The fourteen-year maximum was reduced to ten years by an amendment on the floor of
the legislature. See PENNSYLVANIA PACKET, Sept. 1, 1786, at 3 (After an amendment to change
the fourteen years to seven years had been defeated, another member proposed ten years
instead of fourteen. This amendment "was agreed to" after supporters argued that although
seven years would not be long enough to reform the worst offenders, ten years "was full
enough.").
84. Act of Sep. 15, 1786, ch. 1241, § 13, 12 Pa. Stat. 280, 288 (Harrisburg Pub. Co. 1906).
85. ROBERT LEVERE BRUNHOUSE, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN PENNSYLVANIA
1776-1790, at 184 (1942) ("In the fall of 1785 a petition signed by Justices McKean and Bryan,
[both Constitutionalists,] and other prominent citizens asked for changes in the law and
suggested the method of punishment at hard labor 'publicly and disgracefully imposed,' as an
innovation."); G.S. ROWE, THOMAS MCKEAN: THE SHAPING OF AN AMERICAN
REPUBLICANISM 237-38 & n.22 (1978) (noting that Hopkinson claimed that the justices helped
pen the bill); Chapin, supra note 14, at 168 (noting that William Bradford wrote the reform
statute in 1786).
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partisan favor ("There is sufficient reason to believe, that a scarlet
robe is not a certain security against the operation of party influ-
ence. .. ."); dangerous centralization of power (given the power to set
punishment and then pardon, "[t]he thing would have been complete
if the act had given these demi-gods a power of granting religious
absolution, as well as temporal restoration"); and inconsistency ("If
they should award one man four weeks, and another fourteen years
punishment for the same offense-for a crime of the same enormity,
under all circumstances, will an action lie against them, or can they be
impeached for the injustice? Surely not... .").86 Juries seemed to
Hopkinson to be the logical choice for exercising discretionary
sentencing power. Hopkinson explained that in sentencing, the
"supposed law knowledge" of judges "can be of no possible use."
The authority to sentence
can no where be lodged so safely as with the jury who find the fact.
The proportion of punishment, equitably due according to the na-
ture of the offence, is not a question involved in the technical sub-
tleties of the law; but arises from the particular circumstances of the
case .... and an honest, impartial, and conscientious jury, are as
competent to this purpose, as the most profound judge. They will
necessarily have heard the state of the whole matter, with the ar-
guments for the prosecution, and in behalf of the prisoner; and be-
ing a temporary body, accidentally brought together, and
impannelled for the occasion, are more likely to do substantial jus-
tice, than a judge who is so hackneyed in criminal prosecutions....
If juries were so entrusted, they would probably hold their of-
fice in higher estimation than they do now: they would spurn at the
idea of their being legal machines, subject to the management of
the court: and feeling themselves competent to the business, would
execute their duty with dignity, propriety, and good conscience.
As juries determine the quantum of damage in a civil action,
there seems to be no reason why they should not also determine the
quantum of punishment in a criminal process, within such limits as
the law shall prescribe. 87
When the bill was eventually introduced into the legislature, Re-
publican opponents proposed an amendment that would have elimi-
nated judicial discretion to fix the term of sentence, and would have
substituted a certain and mandatory sentence of seven years' hard
labor.88 The first stated reason for the amendment was the greater
86. 2 THE MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS AND OCCASIONAL WRITINGS OF FRANCIS
HOPKINSON, ESQ. 97-99, 104-05 (1792) (emphasis omitted).
87. Id. at 101-02 (emphasis omitted).
88. PENNSYLVANIA PACKET, Sept. 1, 1786, at 2.
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deterrent power of certain punishment. A proponent of the amend-
ment explained:
That this power must go to the judges is very singular, and is highly
prejudicial to this country... now if we make the power of the
judge discretionary, our liberty is in a poor situation .... [W]e
should not leave it in the breast of any judge or jury to determine
the punishment; but let the offender read for himself, and know
what he has to expect.
89
Speaking against the amendment, supporters of the bill argued
that "circumstances might happen to heighten or mitigate" offenses,
"different, nay even the same crimes, require different degrees of
punishment.... [B]ut the power of determining ... must be left
somewhere or other."9 This power had to rest with the judges, the
bill's supporters argued, because the only other option-jury sentenc-
ing-was an inferior alternative. Nowhere would this discretion be
"so proper (having such full information) as [with] the judges: leave it
to juries, and you then make them both judges and jury."91 "I would
by no means wish to have it left to the jury to determine the punish-
ment," explained one, "because their time for considering is short,
and they have no official character to lose; but the judge has time for
consideration, and has every tie [sic] to preserve his impartiality. '" 92
Another supporter dismissed the idea of jury sentencing as prepos-
terous: "[B]y no means" should the discretion to select sentences be
"left to a jury, who would differ so widely from a number of acciden-
tal causes in crimes of a similar nature, that it would reflect dishonor
upon the state: nor are they responsible for any part of their conduct,
which the judges are."93
Republicans attempted another argument, and proposed lodging
the discretionary power in the Executive Council, which "ha[s] long
had and exercised this power; for whenever the sentence of the law
has been too severe, council had and did mitigate it.... [In] all free
governments the judges should pronounce what the law was, and not
their own private opinion of what is right." 94 The Executive Council
at the time was controlled by Republicans, while the bench was







95. According to historian Robert Brunhouse:
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I see no reason why the punishment should not be in the power of
the court: they are bound by the law; and cannot go beyond its pro-
vision: the crime may deserve the highest degree of punishment,
and they are confined and cannot punish further than fourteen
years. Sir, the discretionary power there given is necessary; for
though council have and always will have the power to remit the
punishment of the criminal, yet as they cannot ascertain the evi-
dence without much trouble (during which they will have to leave
affairs of a more national concern) ... if the court was to fix the
time that the punishment should continue, application to council
would then be unnecessary. 96
The Republicans tried yet another tack to gather support for
their amendment, arguing that granting judges sentencing discretion
"was placing the judges in a very disagreeable situation; for as the
criminal knows his sentence depends altogether upon them, he will
take every method of teasing them into a mitigation." 97 This allega-
tion of corruption prompted one of the bill's supporters to get testy:
"it was well known that the bill under consideration did not come
from the judges; that it came from another quarter, and he hoped it
was not a party matter nor never would be." 9 He added that juries
were more likely to acquit if the penalty was fixed; "but if the judge
has the power of quadrating the punishment to the crime, the jury's
humanity will then not be affected." 99 The amendment to eliminate
judicial discretion and substitute mandatory terms was then defeated
by a narrow margin, with twenty-six in favor and thirty-four against.1°°
The defeat of this amendment settled the issue, although debate
on various aspects of the bill continued for days. 0l In a last effort to
The Republicans generally wanted to set a definite term of years for the punishment
of given offenses which the judges would be required to impose when sentencing
offenders. If there were good reasons why the full sentence should not be served,
then the offender could resort to the Executive Council which had the pardoning
power. The Constitutionalists, on the other hand, insisted that there should be a
discretionary power vested in the court whereby light punishment might be meted
out at once if the case seemed to merit it. One point was clear in the minds of the
assembly men; the Republicans were unwilling to lodge a discretionary power in the
hands of the supreme court which was dominated by their rivals, the Constitutional-
ists. Council was in the hands of the Republicans and their opponents were just as
loath to confer powers, which in turn became favors, on that body.
BRUNHOUSE, supra note 85, at 184,
96. PENNSYLVANIA PACKET, Sept. 1, 1786, at 2.




101. Republicans continued to refer to the potential abuse the bill invited, arguing that if the
sentence "be left in the power of the magistrates it would be an object with the thieves to make
friends with them, and share the spoil." Id.; see also Michael Meranze, The Penitential Ideal in
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enlist additional opposing votes, one Republican legislator argued
that it "will hardly ever be the case" that the judges "are above
suspicion."
[Judges] are not immortal; and we do not know who may succeed
them.... [A] mitigating power should not be given them: the
judges should be confined to pronounce the law only, and not make
it.... The law affixes the sentence, and the jury determine[s]
whether [the accused] has committed the crime deserving of it. 02
Shortly thereafter the bill passed, fifty-seven to four. 03
The new reformative penal philosophy demanded not mandatory
penalties, rigidly applied to each and every offender, but discretion-
ary ranges, allowing a more perfect calibration of punishment to the
varied culpability and reformative capacity of those who violate even
the very same statutory prohibition. An effort to substitute manda-
tory penalties for lesser crimes as well was defeated after one legisla-
tor argued there was "no reason why the court should be limited in
the punishment of trivial crimes when they are unbounded in those of
a higher nature." 104 Even a provision requiring mandatory sentences
for habitual offenders was rejected as too binding on judicial discre-
tion.1° In Pennsylvania, it was the judiciary, not the jury or the
pardoning Council, who would perform this calibration.
To the great consternation of the reformers, Pennsylvania's first
experiment with public labor backfired. The resulting spectacle of
gangs of drunken, profane, and violent prisoners forced to labor in
chains in the streets soon proved disastrous. 1°6 By 1790, the legisla-
ture had substituted the penalty of solitary confinement and labor
within the walls of Pennsylvania's Walnut Street jail, which had been
newly remodeled to accommodate the latest penal philosophy. 07 No
Late Eighteenth Century Philadelphia, 108 PENN. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 419, 429 (1984)
(noting that opponents of the bill recommended that sentencing discretion rest either with the
Executive Council or with juries).
102. PENNSYLVANIA PACKET, Sept. 11, 1786, at 3.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. PENNSYLVANIA PACKET, Sept. 4, 1786, at 2 (Explained one critic of this provision,
"The power is discretionary in the judges on the first offence, and why should it not be in the
second?").
106. See CALEB LOWNES, AN ACCOUNT OF THE ALTERATION AND PRESENT STATE OF
THE PENAL LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA (1799) (The 1786 act "had a very opposite effect from
what was contemplated.... The disorders in society, the robberies, burglaries, breaches of
prison, alarms in town and country-the drunkenness, profanity and indecencies of the
prisoners in the streets, must be in the memory of most."); NEGLEY K. TEETERS, THEY WERE
IN PRISON: A HISTORY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA PRISON SOCIETY, 1787-1937, at 22-26 (1937).
107. For more on the evolution of penal philosophy in Pennsylvania during this period, see
LEWIS, supra note 83, at 25-32.
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effort, however, was made after 1786 to restore mandatory sentences
or withdraw from judges their sentencing authority. From 1786 on, in
Pennsylvania the power to select punishment terms within legislated
ranges remained with judges.108
D. Virginia Follows Pennsylvania, with a Twist
Most of the provisions drafted by committee members Jefferson,
Wythe, and Pendleton before 1779 were revised again, introduced,
and enacted in 1792, but the penal code was not among the bills
submitted to the Assembly in the early 1790s.10 9 By the time the
Virginia legislature again considered penal reform, it was 1796. The
1796 bill was championed by George Keith Taylor of Prince George's
County.11° Taylor, Virginia's "father of penal reform," was a descen-
dant of a celebrated Quaker clergyman of Pennsylvania, and, like
Jefferson himself, a prot6g6 of George Wythe."1 The Assembly
passed Taylor's bill just before Christmas in 1796. Apparently, as
Jefferson later surmised, public opinion had "ripen[ed], by time, by
reflection, and by the example of Pennsylvania."'" 2 The Assembly
earmarked $30,000 for the new penitentiary house.n 3 Its construction
was completed in 1800.114
Like Jefferson's earlier bill, Taylor's penal reform bill abolished
clergy and replaced capital punishment with other penalties for
felonies, but retained death as a punishment for first-degree mur-
der. "5 There were several significant differences, however, between
the 1796 and the 1779 bills.
108. For a fascinating empirical account of sentencing in Philadelphia from 1795 to 1829, see
Batsheva Spiegel Epstein, Patterns of Sentencing and Their Implementation in Philadelphia
City and County, 1795-1829 (1981) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania)
(on file with the University of Pennsylvania library).
109. The revisal of 1792 included the passage of eighty-six bills between October 17 and
December 28, 1792. Charles Cullen noted that the Assembly rejected only five other bills
submitted by the revisers. Of the rejected bills that he lists, none concerned crime or punish-
ment. Cullen, supra note 69, at 97.
110. KEVE, supra note 71, at 3.
111. Edward Wyatt, IV, George Keith Taylor, 1769-1815, Virginia Federalist and Humanitar-
ian, 16 WM. & MARY Q. (2d ser.) 1 (1936). Taylor was a lawyer trained under George Wythe at
William & Mary, who later married a sister of John Marshall. Id.
112. 1 JEFFERSON WRITINGS, supra note 54, at 47.
113. Nov. 1796 Va. Laws ch. 2, § 19, at 6.
114. See KEVE, supra note 71, at 20. New York expended $200,000 to build Newgate, its
first prison. LEWIS, supra note 83, at 44.
115. Nov. 1796 Va. Laws ch. 2, at 4-9. The 1796 act covered enumerated felonies only. It
was not until 1800 that the legislature declared that all crimes formerly punished by execution
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Historian Kathryn Preyer reports that Taylor's bill as submitted
would have provided jury trials for slaves.116 This provision was
removed, however, and the act as passed extended no new benefits to
slaves. Unlike free blacks, who until 1832 were provided the same
process provided to whites,"I7 slaves continued to be tried for their
crimes by magistrates, without juries.118 Sentences included death and
whipping, but not imprisonment. "[Lioss of freedom was hardly a
punishment for a person who had no freedom, and fines could not be
assessed against a person who had no money.""' 9 Additionally, white
Virginians would have considered confinement and labor in the
penitentiary to be a wasted effort for those who they deemed had no
virtue to restore.20 Many slaves sentenced to die received clergy and
were to be punished by imprisonment. Act of Jan. 25, 1800, § 1, Dec. 1799 Va. Laws ch. 58, at
30.
116. Preyer, supra note 4, at 77 (citing "Virginia State Library House of Delegates, Loose
Papers, 1796"). Taylor himself reportedly was a slaveholder who litigated on behalf of slaves
for their freedom. Wyatt, supra note 111, at 11.
117. JOHN H. RUSSELL, THE FREE NEGRO IN VIRGINIA, 1619-1865, at 103-04, 06 (1913);
see also KEVE, supra note 71, at 46, 50 (noting that the existence of blacks seems to have been
given no thought in the original prison planning; that there was no segregation of blacks and
whites in prison; and that superintendents argued that the presence of blacks was a bad
influence on white convicts); MATrIHEWS, supra note 26, at 84:
The term of confinement in the penitentiary or in jail, of a white person convicted of
felony, where that punishment is prescribed, and of a free negro convicted of felony in
a circuit court, when that punishment is to be inflicted, shall be ascertained by the jury;
and if a free negro be convicted of felony in a county or corporation court, shall be
ascertained by such court, so far as it is not fixed by law.
(citing "1 R.C. p. 619, § 12. Acts 1847-8, p. 123, § 18").
Free blacks alone were punishable for certain offenses, however, and suffered different
penalties. In 1823, the legislature provided that free blacks convicted of crimes previously
punishable with imprisonment for more than two years were thereafter to be "whipped,
transported, and sold into slavery beyond the limits of the United States." RUSSELL, supra, at
105-06. This law was repealed four years later, but only after thirty free blacks were trans-
ported and sold into slavery. PHILIP J. SCHWARZ, TWICE CONDEMNED: SLAVES AND THE
CRIMINAL LAWS OF VIRGINIA, 1705-1865, at 318 (1988). Sentence differentials for blacks and
whites remained in place through 1865, except from 1848 to 1860 when the statute imposed
equal minimum sentences. KEVE, supra note 71, at 52; RUSSELL, supra, at 106.
118. Daniel J. Flanigan, Criminal Procedure in Slave Trials in the Antebellum South, 40 J. S.
HIST. 537, 550 (1974) ("The great protection of trial by jury, so dear to the common law, gave
less security to slaves than to whites." Some suggested, however, "that trial by magistrates was
actually a boon to the slave, since the justices were far more select than a jury and one
dissenting vote would result in acquittal."). Of course, slaves were primarily punished by their
owners in private. KEVE, supra note 71, at 12.
119. KEVE, supra note 71, at 11.
120. See id. at 4:
The new humanitarian institution of the penitentiary "did not fit well with the pres-
ence of slavery"; there was a stress between the two which required continual efforts to
reconcile the principles of imprisonment with the questions of how to punish those
persons who already had no real freedom that could be restricted, no property that
could be attained, no civil rights that could be abridged.
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were returned to their owners.'21 Others were transported after
commutation by the governor. 122 Planters were reimbursed by the
state for slaves transported or executed. 123 They sometimes provided
vigorous defense for their slaves in court. 24 The basic outline of the
criminal justice process for slaves remained unchanged until the Civil
War. In 1857, in the courthouse for Appomattox County, counsel for
Reuben, a slave charged with murdering another slave, argued that
the lack of indictment or trial by jury violated his rights under the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The justices rejected the claim and
Reuben was promptly hanged. 2 5 Only eight years later, just a short
distance away from the room in which Reuben was condemned,
Robert E. Lee would surrender forever Virginia's hope of preserving
the institution of slavery.
Most of the remaining departures from Jefferson's bill tracked
Pennsylvania's model. In contrast with the corporal punishments in
Jefferson's bill, Taylor's bill imposed imprisonment at hard labor as
the penalty for most offenses. 26 Castration, lex talionis, ducking, and
the like were all absent. For example, our fictitious felon Smith's
crime of mayhem would have been punished by confinement in the
penitentiary for a term not less than two nor more than ten years, and
121. SCHWARZ, supra note 117, at 24-28 (noting that by the 1780s full pardons for slaves
increased dramatically, and "reduction of felony charges to misdemeanor verdicts continued, as
did the numerous grants of benefit of clergy..." partly because owners sent trained attorneys to
represent their slaves); Conklin, supra note 10, at 361-65. The abolition of benefit of clergy in
1796 did not extend to slaves. Clergy instead persisted until 1848-slaves continued to plead for
benefit of clergy for the more than sixty offenses. Id.
122. KEVE, supra note 71, at 47. Philip J. Schwarz, in his article, The Transportation of
Slaves from Virginia, 1801-1865, 7 SLAVERY & ABOLITION 215, 215-19 (1986), relates that in
the 1780s and 90s, slaves condemned to hang were regularly pardoned, but the pardon was
conditioned upon the owner selling the pardoned slave out of the state. Transportation was
cheaper than execution because the state was reimbursed for the cost of paying the owner the
condemned slave's market value, which was determined by the judge who pronounced a
sentence. He relates the 1838 story of how John, sentenced to be hanged for attempted rape of
a white woman, was reprieved, taken to prison for six months, and sold to a slave trader who
promised but failed to take John and twenty-six other slaves out of the country, selling them
instead in New Orleans. "Transports" were held temporarily at the penitentiary. SCHWARZ,
supra note 117, at 28; see also KEVE, supra note 71, at 48, 55 (noting that four rooms designated
for holding transports were built at the penitentiary after 1824).
123. KEVE, supra note 71, at 47-49.
124. Id. at 14; SCHWARZ, supra note 117, at 23.
125. SCHWARZ, supra note 117, at 289-90.
126. Nov. 1796 Va. Laws ch. 2, §§ 4-11, at 4-5 (providing high treason, 6-12 years; arson, 5-
12 years; rape, 10-21 years; second-degree murder, 5-18 years; robbery or burglary, restitution
and 3-10 years; horse stealing, restitution and 2-7 years; larceny up to four dollars, restitution
and 1-3 years; petty larceny, restitution and 6 months to 1 year; forgery and counterfeiting, 4-15
years and "such fine as the court shall adjudge"; maiming, 2-10 years and "a fine not exceeding
one thousand dollars, three fourths whereof shall be for the use of the party grieved"; voluntary
manslaughter, 2-10 years (second offense 6-14 years)).
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a fine not to exceed $1,000.127 Taylor's bill also reflected the lessons
learned by Pennsylvanians after their experiment with public labor
backfired. 12 8 Instead of mandating public labor as Jefferson's bill had,
Taylor's bill provided for solitary confinement and quiet industry
inside a penitentiary1 29 Taylor's bill also followed the lead of Penn-
sylvania in adopting discretionary sentence ranges within which a
sentence would be selected for each offender, rather than a single
punishment for all who commit a certain offense. Indeed, this substi-
tution of discretionary terms of imprisonment in the penitentiary for
former modes of punishment was soon to sweep the nation. By 1838,
all but five of the twenty-six states had established their own peniten-
tiaries. 130
There was one crucial difference between the revised criminal
code in Virginia and that of Pennsylvania, however. In Virginia,
juries, not judges, were given the power to select the sentence within
the legislature's designated range.13t As we have seen, prior to the
act, the district court judges in Virginia, like judges in Pennsylvania
before that state's penal reform, exercised significant sentencing
discretion in felony cases, picking and choosing those who would be
executed and those who would receive clergy. These same judges,
then, would have been the logical repository for sentencing authority
when the legislature changed the nature of the penalty from execu-
tion and clergy to imprisonment. Moreover, magistrate judges, not
juries, had traditionally selected terms of imprisonment in misde-
127. Id. § 10, at 5.
128. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
129. Jefferson himself, by that time, had changed his mind about the rehabilitative effects of
shaming prisoners through public works. See KEVE, supra note 71, at 15.
130. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 25TH CONG., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE, APPOINTED AT THE SESSION OF 1838, ON THE SUBJECT OF THE PENITENTIARY
SYSTEM 5 (1838). The special committee also reported:
Branding, whipping, the pillory, stocks, cropping and imprisonment in common jails,
tend only to harden the convict and entirely destroy what little of virtue and feeling
there may be left in his guilty bosom. Instead of being deterred from the commission
of crime, he is turned loose on society, without shame and without remorse, with
feelings of deep and dark revenge for the injury and cruelty which he has suffered.
On the other hand, the punishment inflicted by the Penitentiary system is mild,
though more effectual, and may be graduated to suit every shade of crime and every
age, habit and character of the culprits.... When restored to the world, he has no
vindictive feelings to gratify. He has received no brutal treatment at the hands of the
law. No mark of eternal infamy has been stamped on his person.
Id. at 4.
131. Nov. 1796 Va. Laws ch. 2, § 15, at 5 ("The jury before whom any offender may be tried,
shall decide upon, and in their verdict ascertain the time within the respective periods
prescribed, during which such offenders shall undergo confinement in the gaol and penitentiary
house herein after mentioned, according to the directions of this act.").
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meanor cases. When discretionary punishment was extended from
misdemeanor to felony cases, it would have been logical to allow
judges to maintain this function. Indeed, this was the path taken by
Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey, each of which substituted
the prison cell for the noose before the turn of the century and
retained sentencing authority in the bench.1 2 For Virginia's legisla-
ture to give to juries the authority to select a term of imprisonment
was a decisive shift of power away from judges. The mystery is-
why?
E. Why Juries and Not Judges?
Historians researching Virginia's penal reform of 1796 have un-
earthed very little information about the rationale for the changes
from the original 1779 reform bill. They have found no record of how
the later bill came to be introduced by Taylor, how much, if at all,
Taylor drew upon Jefferson's original 1779 version or consulted with
Jefferson himself, or whether Taylor or other assemblymen engaged
in a debate like the one in Pennsylvania over the proper locus of
sentencing authority.133 Taylor himself, in his lengthy and impas-
sioned floor speech delivered in a desperate effort to save the bill,
does not even mention who would set the sentence under his pro-
posal. Instead, his speech was concerned primarily with the inability
of the existing laws to deter crime due to the universal reluctance to
impose the death penalty for minor crimes and with the proven
success of more certain punishment. 134
The explanation for the choice of jury over judge could be quite
simple: Taylor merely could have expanded the idea already captured
in those two provisions of Jefferson's earlier bill that delegated to
juries the authority to select a sentence. Alternatively, Taylor, a
Federalist later appointed to the federal bench as one of John Ad-
132. See infra app.
133. Kathryn Preyer summed it up this way:
Details about the evolution and passage of this legislation are as elusive as for Jeffer-
son's proposal almost 20 years before. No debate is reported in the Journal of the
House of Delegates and none has been located elsewhere. The bill passed the House
on Dec. 7 by a vote of 95-66 and the Senate on Dec. 15, no vote being recorded.
Blocs of opposition votes in the House centered in Grayson and Pittsylvania counties
to the west along the North Carolina border but as a whole the vote may illustrate the
localized force of particular domestic issues in Virginia referred to by....
Preyer, supra note 4, at 76 n.85.
134. George Keith Taylor, Substance of a Speech Delivered in the House of Delegates of
Virginia, on the Bill to Amend the Penal Laws of This Commonwealth (1796).
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ams's "midnight judges,' 13 5 may have preferred to keep sentencing
power from the Republicans on the district court benches, 136 just as
the Republicans in Pennsylvania tried to deny sentencing power to
their enemies on the bench, the Constitutionalists. But even if
Taylor's motives can be understood, what explains the legislature's
agreement to the new arrangement?
A.G. Roeber's history of Virginia's early justice system suggests
that the choice of jury rather than judge as sentencer would have
been popular at the time because of the widespread distrust of the
judges who staffed the district court bench. Virginians clearly dis-
trusted their county justices of the peace. They derided magistrates
as "self-perpetuating oligarchies unsympathetic to republican ways,
and not particularly concerned with republican virtue either.' 1 37 It is
possible, of course, that this sort of contempt was directed only at lay
magistrates, and that it did not extend to those judges who would
have sentenced in felony cases had Virginia followed Pennsylvania's
lead. For example, Jefferson's earlier remarks about limiting judges
to the function of a "mere machine" and his decision to allow juries to
choose penalties for two offenses in the 1779 proposal both suggest
that he distrusted even felony court judges at that time. 138 But, if so,
his attitude and the attitudes of his peers seems to have softened by
1796. Indeed, in later years, Jefferson drew a sharp distinction
between the untrained lay justices of the peace, whom he despised as
undemocratic and unlearned, 139 and those jurists who sat as judges of
the general and district court. The high court judges, the very best of
the Virginia bench and bar, were selected by the legislature for their
superior ability. They had studied the recently published laws of the
135. Wyatt, supra note 111, at 14; see also MILLER, supra note 6, at 53 (describing George
Keith Taylor as a leader on the Federalist side in the debates over the Virginia Resolution of
1798).
136. See ROEBER, supra note 6, at 204-16 (discussing the politics of judges serving on the
District Court in the late 1790s). F. Thornton Miller describes the population of the benches:
The state judicial machinery was created and put in place only to be filled often by the
very same people the reformers had opposed. Many had been appointed to the Gen-
eral Court in the 1780s by a legislature that Henry and his party [anti-Federalists] had
dominated and they continued to be able to control this body on particular issues.
... Most of the eight judges who, in different sessions in the next several years, pre-
sided over the district court at Prince Edward County courthouse had been in Henry's
party-which had opposed court reform.
MILLER, supra note 6, at 28-29.
137. ROEBER, supra note 6, at 184, 220-21.
138. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
139. Gratiot, supra note 11, at 146.
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Commonwealth,' 4° and were liberally educated and trained in the law.
Many were law graduates of William & Mary, where George Wythe
and Jefferson himself had established the nation's first professional
education program for lawyers in 1779.141 Jefferson looked forward to
the day when all of the Commonwealth's judges would have received
such training, and he was not alone in his views.1 42  More of these
professionally trained lawyers were elected to the legislature during
this period, including Taylor himself. 143 It was at least possible that
Taylor and a majority of those in the Assembly in 1796 had more
confidence in the new judicial elite than they had in the lay judiciary.
In any event, whatever growing trust there was in the new class
of men elevated to the bench of the Virginia district court, it had yet
to penetrate the public mind. According to Roeber, "[o]ther Virgini-
ans trusted less in a cerebral republican elite than in their own local
common sense attitudes."" He noted that by 1800, "[p]ublic percep-
tion of the threats posed to a republican society fixed not on the old
county court but rather on the rising elite of lawyers and judges.
1 ' 45
Indeed, some district court judges openly expressed their distrust of
140. William Walter Hening had just completed the first published set of laws in 1795, and
Judge St. George Tucker was laboring away on his edition of Blackstone's Commentaries so as
to diffuse the science of law throughout the Commonwealth. TIMOTHY S. HEUBNER, THE
SOUTHERN JUDICIAL TRADITION: STATE JUDGES AND SECTIONAL DISTINCTIVENESS, 1790-
1890, at 12 (1999); ROEBER, supra note 6, at 217, 246.
141. ROEBER, supra note 6, at 167; James W. Ely, Jr. & David J. Bodenhamer, Regionalism
and the Legal History of the South, in AMBIVALENT LEGACY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE
SOUTH 3, 16 (David J. Bodenhamer & James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 1984).
142. ROEBER, supra note 6, at 167-68, 216, 220-21, 224-25; see also 1 JEFFERSON
WRITINGS, supra note 54, at 211-12 ("I hope to see the time when the election of judges of the
Supreme Courts shall be restrained to the bars of the General Court and High Court of
Chancery .. "); HEUBNER, supra note 140, at 12 (Jefferson believed, as did George Wythe, that
"in order to secure a legal culture compatible with the ideals of the Revolution, Virginia
required a professionally trained bench and bar, composed of men both technically skilled and
liberally educated.").
143. ROEBER, supra note 6, at 240 (noting the increasing number of lawyers in the
Assembly).
144. Id. at 171.
145. Id. at 240. Roeber observes that the Republican lawyers had
succeed[ed] in establishing a streamlined court system, and the luster of the superior
court bench and bar had attracted large numbers of young Virginians to seek their
fortunes in the practice of law. But the lawyers had not quite succeeded in convincing
Virginia farmers and planters that the older, moral vision of law rooted in concepts of
natural justice had survived the rise of the legal profession.
.... [T]he complaints of ordinary Virginians expressed in the newspapers and
discovered by lawyers seeking election seem to suggest that the typical attorney cared
very little about the moral bases of law.
Id. at 254-55. "[For some Virginians the success of republican lawyers in erecting a more
efficient state court system was too high a price to pay for the bettering of decisions that were
almost impossible to get from the county courts after 1783." Id. at 252.
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jurors, thinking them unworthy of the task. 146 No doubt this sort of
attitude would have caused many Virginians to wonder whether they
could rely on the judgment of judges to reflect the public will in
sentencing or in other matters. 47 The choice to confer the power of
sentencing on the jury rather than the judge is a sign that the elites on
the bench, of whatever party, Republican or Federalist, had not won
the confidence of a majority in the Assembly.
While distrust of judges appears to be a promising explanation
for Virginia's move to jury sentencing in 1796, it is ultimately inade-
quate. Several features of Virginia law seem inconsistent with
widespread distrust of judicial sentencing authority. The entrustment
of sentencing authority to juries was remarkably halfhearted. Despite
dissatisfaction with county justices of the peace, the 1796 act changed
neither the penalties nor the process for misdemeanor charges.
Virginia's magistrates continued to fix jail terms and all penalties
other than fines in these cases.14 Perhaps a sizeable number of
legislators would have preferred a bill that proposed jury sentencing
for minor crimes in 1796, but were persuaded that judicial sentencing
could be tolerated so long as the power of judges was limited to
imposing short terms of incarceration nearby in the local jail. Or,
perhaps they were reluctant to risk losing the votes of magistrates
who were then serving in the legislature and who would have been
protective of their authority. 149 Or, perhaps the legislature was not
ready to take this sort of step before a drafting committee had
thoroughly examined misdemeanor sentencing. The bill it did adopt
had originated in Jefferson's committee, which had studied only those
crimes then punishable by death. Whatever the reason, the sharing of
sentencing power between magistrate judge and juries for minor
146. Id. at 225.
147. Id. at 258-59. "The ... tradition in the South and the West that distrusted lawyers and
felt more at home with laymen administering the law declined after1896 as a politically potent
force in American life." Id. at 258. However, "Virginia could never celebrate fully the rise of
lawyers, bankers, merchants, and other moderns, because the culture of the Old Dominion was
one that had long been suspicious of such people." Id. at 259.
148. See supra note 26. Juries continued to set fines in misdemeanor cases. See, e.g., Act of
Feb. 26, 1819, § 47, 1819 Va. Laws ch. 21, at 30; Commonwealth v. Alexander, 14 Va. (4 Hen. &
M.) 522 (1808) (affirming the conviction of a justice of the peace found guilty for misbehavior
and the jury's amercing him the sum of fifty dollars); Commonwealth v. Chapman, 3 Va. (1 Va.
Cas.) 138 (1803) (reporting that jury convicted and fined defendant $450 for bribing deputy
sheriff to induce him to summon people the defendant named); Jones v. Commonwealth, 5 Va.
(1 Call) 555 (1799) (reversing a joint fine of £106 for assaulting a magistrate, noting that fines
must be set by the jury according to the degree of fault and the estate of the offender).
149. In 1796, the influence of county justices serving in the Assembly was still significant,
although waning. ROEBER, supra note 6, at 240.
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crimes persisted well after 1796. In its subsequent revisions and
additions to the criminal code, the legislature continued to delegate
misdemeanor sentencing power to magistrates.1
5°
The shift to jury sentencing in 1796 also did not apply in cases of
escaped offenders. The act provided that such an offender was
subject to "suffer such additional corporal punishment, not extending
to life or limb, as the court in which such offender shall have been
convicted, shall adjudge and direct." '51 Judges were also given the
power to impose fines up to $1,000 for forgery and counterfeiting.'52
Discretion was soon to be granted to judges in setting the pun-
ishment for repeat offenders as well.153 The 1796 act included manda-
tory punishment for certain designated repeat offenders: life
imprisonment for those offenders who committed, for the second
time, a felony punished at the time of the 1796 act with death, and
twenty-five years' imprisonment for those who committed an offense
then capital after escape from the penitentiary or after having been
pardoned.114 But as of 1819, many repeat offenders were sentenced at
the discretion of the judge. All of those alleged to be repeat offend-
ers were entitled to a trial in the court in Henrico County, where the
penitentiary was located, if they contested the allegation. Later, this
statute became known as "the Comeback law," for it applied only to
those who had "come back" to the penitentiary.155 If the defendant
contested the allegation of prior conviction, a jury would determine
its accuracy. After the practice of branding offenders had been
150. See, e.g., MAT'HEWS, supra note 26, at 85:
The term of confinement in jail, of a person found guilty of a misdemeanor, where that
punishment is prescribed, shall be ascertained by the court, and the amount of the fine,
where the punishment is by fine, shall, except where it is otherwise provided, be as-
sessed by the jury, so far as the term of confinement, and the amount of the fine, are
not fixed by law.
(citing "Acts 1847-8, p. 123, § 19").
151. Nov. 1796 Va. Laws ch. 2, § 42, at 9:
If any such offender sentenced to hard labour, shall escape, he or she shall on convic-
tion thereof, suffer such additional confinement and hard labour, agreeably to the
directions of this act, and shall also suffer such additional corporal punishment, not
extending to life or limb, as the court in which such offender shall have been convicted,
shall adjudge and direct.
See also Commonwealth v. Ryan, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 467 (1825) (explaining that escape must be
prosecuted by indictment).
152. Nov. 1796 Va. Laws ch. 2, § 9, at 5.
153. Like misdemeanors, the provision of tougher sentences for repeat offenders was not
addressed at all in Jefferson's original bill.
154. Nov. 1796 Va. Laws ch. 2, § 24, at 6.
155. Note, Recidivism and Virginia's "Come-Back" Law, 48 VA. L. REV. 597, 601 n.35
(1962).
[Vol178:937
HeinOnline  -- 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
 968 2003
20031 THE ORIGINS OFFELONYJURYSENTENCING IN THE UNITED STATES 969
abandoned, but before identification techniques such as fingerprint-
ing were developed, resolving the issue of whether or not a defendant
was the same person named in a court record required a full-fledged
trial including witnesses.15 6 If the jurors agreed that indeed the felon
before them had committed his crime after already having been
sentenced for a felony once before, the stubborn lawbreaker, with
proven resistance to the reformative influences of the penitentiary,
would be subject to a much stiffer sentence than that assessed by his
jury in the district court. The repeat offenders who had committed
the most serious crimes faced mandatory life sentences, but if an
offender's last crime was punishable by less than five years-and this
covered a large number of crimes-the offender would face ten to
twenty years' imprisonment. As all other penitentiary sentences were
set by juries, it would have made sense to have entrusted this high-
stakes sentencing to the "comeback" jury. Surprisingly, the Assembly
lodged the power to set repeat offender sentences with the bench.157
Possible explanations include the following: (1) the legislature as-
sumed that a great number of repeat offenders would admit their past
crimes, obviating the need for a jury to determine identity, and that to
have insisted that juries be assembled solely for the purpose of
sentencing an offender was too costly; or (2) hardened criminals
simply did not deserve the same degree of protection afforded first-
time offenders.
Another curious enclave of judicial sentencing discretion was a
provision of the 1796 act requiring that the portion of an offender's
sentence spent in solitary confinement would be determined by the
judge, not the jury. A judge could decree that anywhere between
one-twelfth and one-half of an offender's stay be spent in solitary
confinement on a "low and coarse diet. ' 158 This decision was a
156. For the fascinating story of the evolution of identification techniques, including their
use in identifying convicted criminals, see SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY
OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION (2001).
157. Note, supra note 155, at 598-99; see VA. REV. CODE ch. 171, §§ 14, 16 (1819)
(providing, according to Section 14, that "every such offender, being thereof lawfully convicted,
shall be punished by confinement in the said jail and penitentiary-house, for a period of not less
than ten nor more than twenty years"; and according to Section 16, that "if the said jury shall
find, that the said convict is the same person mentioned in the said records of conviction, or if
the said convict in open court, shall acknowledge, after being duly cautioned, that he is the same
person mentioned as aforesaid, then the said superior court of law shall pronounce sentence
upon the said convict, of confinement in the said jail and penitentiary-house as is herein
provided").
158. Nov. 1796 Va. Laws ch. 2, § 22, at 6; see also CONWAY ROBINSON, 3 PRACTICE IN THE
COURTS OF LAW AND EQuITY IN VIRGINIA 283 (1839) (pointing out that the provision about
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powerful one, given that the conditions in solitary confinement
contributed to an outrageously high mortality rate in the first decades
of the penitentiary. Solitary confinement was celebrated by penal
reformers as providing prisoners the opportunity to turn around their
lives. In practice, those in solitary confinement often lost their lives
instead. In unheated, unlit, stone cells, the air poisoned by fumes
from the nearby city sewage swamp, "[wiater oozed from the walls,
men's feet froze, and several prisoners went mad."'15 9 Many died. The
proportion of prisoner deaths to prisoner admissions reported annu-
ally rose from about 5% to nearly 80% in the first quarter-century, 160
although the length of sentences remained, for the most part, shorter
than ten years' 61 and up to one-half of the prisoners received par-
dons. 162 Children of sixteen and younger were housed there as well as
there was no separate facility for juveniles. 63 A mandatory minimum
term of solitary confinement that could be increased by the judge was
not abandoned until 1838.164
Foreshadowing the present-day erosion of jury sentencing due to
plea bargaining, the 1796 act also gave the court in murder cases the
authority to "determine the degree of the crime, and to give sentence
accordingly" when a defendant was "convicted by confession."' 165
Although the penalty for first-degree murder was not discretionary,
the judge ascertaining the portion served in solitary confinement was later held to apply to all
convictions).
159. EDWARD L. AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE
19TH CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH 38 (1984) ("The surviving inmates emerged from their
solitary cells to join other prisoners in the workshops, where they made leather goods for the
state militia and nails and shoes for sale outside the walls.").
160. KEVE, supra note 71, at 59.
161. See, e.g., SCHWARZ, supra note 117, at 216.
162. KEVE, supra note 71, at 44 (noting that one-half to one-sixth received a pardon, and
that military service was a condition of pardon during Civil War).
163. Id. at 10.
164. In 1824, the legislature raised the minimum to one-eighth of the sentence in solitary,
and never less than six months. Act of Mar. 9, 1824, § 12, Dec. 1823 Va. Laws ch. 10, at 18.
Solitary confinement was "dispensed with, except so far as may be necessary for the proper
discipline and good government of the institution" in 1838. Act of Apr. 6, 1838, § 1, Jan. 1838
Va. Laws ch. 26, at 36-37.
165. Nov. 1796 Va. Laws ch. 2, § 2, at 4; VA. REV. CODE ch. 171, § 2 (1819). Conway
Robinson explained:
It has been already mentioned that the jury before whom any person indicted
for murder shall be tried, if they find such person guilty thereof, are to ascertain in
their verdict whether it be murder in the first or second degree. The statute further
provides that if such person shall be convicted by confession, the court shall proceed,
by examination of witnesses, to determine the degree of the crime, and to give sen-
tence accordingly.
3 ROBINSON, supra note 158, at 280 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
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this crime being the single offense "punished with death" in the new
code, the penalty for second-degree murder was any term between
five and eighteen years in the penitentiary. It is not known how many
defendants confessed to homicide at the time. 166
Interestingly, the distrust of judges that may have prompted leg-
islators to favor jury sentencing was not shared by the jurors them-
selves in many cases. In the years leading up to the 1796 act, Virginia
jurors did not seem eager to exercise the authority that they pos-
sessed to determine punishment. Reported decisions of the general
court demonstrated a curious phenomenon-juries would return
special verdicts, finding the facts only and "pray[ing] the advice of the
court" about whether guilt or innocence would follow from those
facts. 167 These questions of law were in turn "adjourned for difficulty"
to the general court. The verdicts in these cases suggest that the
juries quite willingly delegated the guilt/innocence decision to the
court. Sometimes, the decision left to the court by the jury was
inconsequential in terms of penalty-for example, the choice between
one felony or another, such as the difference between manslaughter
and murder.168 In other cases, the jury left to the judge the decision of
whether the accused would be condemned for a capital offense or be
acquitted outright. For example, a jury declined to decide the fate of
William Williams, tried for stealing a slave out of the possession of his
owner, and preferred to allow the court to make the final call. The
defendant had stolen "Solomon" out of the possession of Thomas
166. Curiously, the rule in misdemeanor cases apparently was that the jury would sentence
even in cases of confession. See Oct. 1786 Va. Laws ch. 64, at 15 (providing that the amerce-
ment for any trespass or misdemeanor "shall be assessed by twelve honest and lawful men,
either those by whom the offender shall have been convicted, in case of a verdict, or those who
shall be impannelled for that special purpose, where judgment shall be given against him upon
the argument of a demurrer, or by his confession or default"); Act of Feb. 26, 1819, § 47, 1819
Va. Laws ch. 21, at 30.
167. Commonwealth v. Crane, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 10 (1791).
168. One jury delivered this "decisive" verdict:
[If the court should be of opinion that the prisoner is guilty of murder, then we of the
jury do find the prisoner is guilty of murder; and if the court shall be of opinion that
the prisoner is not guilty of murder, but guilty of manslaughter, then we the jury do
find the prisoner not guilty of murder, but guilty of manslaughter.
Id. at 13. The trial court adjourned for difficulty the case to the general court, which found the
prisoner guilty of murder. Id. at 14.
In another the case, the jury, after retelling in detail its findings of fact, concluded: "And if
upon the whole matter, the court shall be of opinion that the said Robert Mitchell is guilty of
murder, then we the jury find the said Robert Mitchell guilty of murder; otherwise we the jury
find the said Robert Mitchell guilty of manslaughter only." Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 3 Va. (1
Va. Cas.) 116, 116-19 (1796). The general court found the defendant not guilty of murder and
allowed the manslaughter verdict to stand. Id. at 119.
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Edwards, who was not his owner, but who had hired Solomon for a
year from his owner, Elizabeth Edwards. The jury in its verdict
stated: "Now if the possession of the said Thomas Edwards be the
possession of the said Elizabeth Edwards in law, we find the prisoner
guilty of the felony, with which he stands charged, otherwise we find
him not guilty."'' 69 Another jury left it to the court to decide the effect
of two different spellings of the first name of one of the men whose
signature the defendant allegedly forged:
We of the jury find the prisoner Christian Kearns, guilty of
transferring the certificate specified in the indictment, knowing it to
be forged; if the court shall be of opinion.., that the variance be-
tween the name of Bolling Starke.... and the name of Bowling
Starke ... is not material; otherwise we find him not guilty
thereof.
70
This abdication of power in criminal cases-call it reverse-
nullification for lack of a better term-continued after the penal
reform act took effect. Special verdicts reported in general court
decisions regularly left to judges whether a defendant would be hung,
imprisoned, or spared.171 For example, a verdict from 1812 read:
We of the jury find that the prisoner at the bar, John Thomas, did,
contrary to the order of nature, penetrate the body of a mare of
Joshua Doing; but it is impossible for us to say whether he did, or
did not emit his seed into the body of the said mare, or elsewhere;
and if the court shall be of opinion that the said fact of penetration,
without the fact of emission, constitutes the crime of buggery, then
we find the prisoner guilty, and ascertain the term of his imprison-
ment five years in the penitentiary house; otherwise we find him
not guilty.
172
Another jury sentenced a horse thief to five years, but left the juris-
dictional issue to the court. The jury would have found the defendant
169. Commonwealth v. Williams, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 14 (1792) (finding for defendant).
170. Commonwealth v. Kearns, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 109,112 (1794) (finding for defendant).
171. In a case involving the same issue as in Williams, see supra note 169 and accompanying
text, the verdict read, "if the law is against him, we find him guilty; if the law is not against him,
we find him not guilty." Commonwealth v. Hays, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 122, 122 (1798). The
general court found the defendant not guilty of stealing a slave from the possession of his owner
because the slave was a runaway. Id. at 123; see also Bedinger v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. (3 Call)
461, 461 (1803) (noting jury's verdict of guilty of misdemeanor if court construes communication
as offer to buy vote for Clerk of Court).
172. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 307, 307 (1812). The matter, adjourned
for difficulty to the general court, was resolved against the defendant. Id. at 307-08; see also
Warner v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 95, 95-96 (1817) (The jury found the defendant
guilty of bigamy and fixed the term of his imprisonment in the penitentiary at one year,
"subject, however, to the opinion of the Court on the following questions" and then listed three
questions concerning what proof is required of the first marriage. If these questions were
answered in a certain way, the jury would find the defendant not guilty.).
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guilty, but only if the court concluded that the crime, committed by a
Virginian against another Virginian in the District of Columbia, could
be lawfully prosecuted in Virginia.17 3 It is impossible to gauge how
widespread such special verdicts were, but their regular appearance
suggests that jurors themselves were willing to give up even their
power to acquit and defer to judicial authority.
Finally, another development, albeit years after the passage of
the 1796 act, seems particularly incongruous with a theory that
Virginia's legislators did not trust judges with sentencing power.
Although throughout the South in the first half of the nineteenth
century state legislatures (including those with jury sentencing)
limited judicial power by adopting term limits and popular elections,
this change never took place in the Commonwealth of Virginia.
17 4
That the General Assembly was not forced by Virginians to give over
to the people its power to choose judicial officers could be a sign that
the people were not so dissatisfied with those on the bench that they
felt it essential to maintain direct control over the judicial officers'
transgressions.
All of this suggests not a hardened preference for jury over
judge, but instead a deep ambivalence over whether the bench was
growing more trustworthy or more treacherous. The contrast then
between the experience of Virginia and that of Pennsylvania is not as
stark as a simple comparison of the two acts suggests. Both states
first had to leave behind mandatory penalties and codify discretionary
ranges of punishment. And in both states the choice of judge or jury
as the appropriate authority to choose within those ranges was not
obvious. Pennsylvania's decision to lodge that discretion in the judge
rather than in the jury was the result of a hard-fought political battle,
while Virginia's decision to embrace jury rather than judicial sentenc-
ing was long-delayed, notably incomplete, and quite likely influenced
by party politics as well.
173. Commonwealth v. Gaines, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 172, 173 (1819). Conway Robinson
wrote:
A verdict sometimes does not find the defendant either guilty or not guilty, but
finds certain facts and submits them to the court for its opinion on them. When a
verdict is found of this special nature, it must contain all the facts which are necessary
to enable the court to pronounce for or against the defendant.
3 ROBINSON, supra note 158, at 271 (citing cases).
174. See Ely & Bodenhamer, supra note 141, at 17. The "democratic impulse" to limit terms
of the judiciary, which started as early as 1812 in Georgia, never took hold in Virginia, but it did
in Kentucky. See id.
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Existing sources suggest that the adoption of penal reform and
jury sentencing was not nearly as controversial in at least one of the
states first to choose who would select imprisonment terms-the new
state of Kentucky. In contrast to the debates in Virginia and Penn-
sylvania, there was little doubt which choice Kentucky would make.
II. KENTUCKY
A. Prior to Reform
The region we know now as Kentucky was for many years part of
the Commonwealth of Virginia. Virginia's District of Kentucky
became a state in 1792, but only after some foot dragging by Con-
gress. Those who delayed the recognition of Kentucky's statehood in
Congress were not eager to do any favors for the "perverse republi-
cans of the western wilderness," whose independent spirit had led
eleven of the fourteen delegates to the Virginia convention of 1788
from the Kentucky region to vote against ratifying the federal Consti-
tution.'75
The founders of Kentucky's legal system were lawyers trained in
Virginia who brought with them the law they knew best, including
criminal law and procedure, complete with capital punishment for all
felonies.176 Credit for the framing of Kentucky's first constitution of
1792 is often given to a Virginian, George Nicholas, the most well
regarded lawyer in Kentucky at the time and its first attorney gen-
eral.'77 (He, too, had received his legal training at William & Mary
175. Lucius P. Little, Legislation Concerning Kentucky: History of Important Measures of the
State of Virginia and of the United States Pertaining to Kentucky, and of Kentucky Since Its
Statehood, in THE LAWYERS AND LAWMAKERS OF KENTUCKY 20, 22 (H. Levin ed., 1897). But
see GEORGE L. WILLIS, SR., KENTUCKY CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTIONS: A HUNDRED AND FIFTY YEARS OF STATE POLITICS AND ORGANIC-LAW
MAKING 15-16 (1930) ("There seems from the books to have been no such delay in acting by
Congress as some historians comment upon. For it was the next winter or on February 14, 1791,
that Congress did enact the asked-for legislation providing that the District of Kentucky should
become a State on June 1, 1792....").
176. JOAN WELLS COWARD, KENTUCKY IN THE NEW REPUBLIC: THE PROCESS OF
CONSTITUTION MAKING 12-47 (1979); Gratiot, supra note 11, at 258, 275-76.
177. W.M. Beckner, Kentucky While a Part of Virginia and the Administration of the Law
Therein, in THE LAWYERS AND LAWMAKERS OF KENTUCKY, supra note 175, at 7, 15; R.C.
Richardson, Court of Appeals: An Historic Outline from the Date of Its Organization with
Character Sketches of Its Judges, Reference to the Most Important Questions Heard and Decided,
and Reminiscences of Its Bar, in THE LAWYERS AND LAWMAKERS OF KENTUCKY, supra note
175, at 44, 48; The Louisville Bench and Bar, in THE LAWYERS AND LAWMAKERS OF
KENTUCKY, supra note 175, at 161, 215-16. Together with other Virginia lawyers, Nicholas was
primarily responsible for framing the laws and institutions of the new state. See
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under George Wythe.) 78 In its first constitution, Kentucky adopted
all Virginia law that was not repugnant to its provisions, 1 9 and by
1798, Kentucky criminal justice suffered from the same problems that
its mother state had experienced, only greatly amplified. As histori-
ans have so colorfully and carefully documented, criminal justice in
early Kentucky courts was far from swift and sure.
Magistrates wielded enormous power over the lives of Ken-
tucky's settlers, 180 and, as was true of the justices in Virginia, few of
them were trained in the law and many were suspected of corruption
and accused of malfeasance.18 1 In 1792, the legislature removed
patronage power from county courts. No longer could these judges
choose the sheriff, clerk, and their own successors.18 2 To discourage
malicious prosecutions, prosecutors were required to reimburse the
defendant for costs of prosecution, including the costs of the defen-
dant's attorney, fees to witnesses, and pay for jurors if the defendant
COMMONWEALTH OF KY. LEGIS. RES. COMM'N, HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF KENTUCKY
COURTS, RESEARCH PUBLICATION NO. 63, at 28 (1958) [hereinafter HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT] (The drafters of the first Kentucky constitution "turned to Virginia for a plan,
and patterned our court system after the one then existing in the parent-commonwealth.").
The "private and professional characters" of Kentucky's first lawyers "were modeled after
those members of the bar in Virginia under whom they had as a general rule 'studied' their
profession." Beckner, supra, at 18. For more on the Virginia lawyers who founded Kentucky's
laws, see COWARD, supra note 176, at 12; Beckner, supra, at 18; Gratiot, supra note 11, at 105-
40.
178. Gratiot, supra note 11, at 110.
179. 1 HARRY TOULMIN & JAMES BLAIR, A REVIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY ix (Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons, 1983) (1804).
180. In 1796 any magistrate could issue a warrant to apprehend any person charged before
him with any criminal offence, "which in the opinion of such justice, ought to be examined
into .... " HARRY TOULMIN, A COLLECTION OF ALL THE PUBLIC AND PERMANENT ACTS OF
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF KENTUCKY WHICH ARE NOW IN FORCE 331 (1802) (Act of Dec.
17, 1796, § 1).
181. IRELAND, supra note 7, at 7-8, 14. Between 1792 and 1796, Fayette County records
show the average term for magistrates at less than two years, although the turnover slowed after
1799. Id. at 9-10. Typically the justices met monthly at the county seat. Id. at 10-11. Justices
owned nearly nine times as much land, seven times as many slaves, and two and a half times as
much other taxable property as the average white male adult in their counties. Id. at 12-13.
Magistrates often voted to oust those of their own accused of malfeasance. IRELAND, supra
note 7, at 118-19; see also id. at 15, 114-15 ("Between 1792 and 1851, almost a fourth of the
members of the lower house and a fifth of the upper house of the legislature were magistrates,"
a situation that generated "periodic spasms of opposition," and accusations of self-dealing in
raising their own fees.). The practice of office selling was established, and "the collusion of
county courts in these venal practices prompted efforts at reform" and "growing public
disenchantment over county government." Id. at 79-95. Robert Ireland speculated that the
only income some magistrates received was from the illegal sale of various county offices. Id. at
7-8; see also VINCE STATEN, LAW AT THE FALLS: HISTORY OF THE LOUISVILLE LEGAL
PROFESSION 15 (1997) (relating a case in which a grand jury indicted its county magistrates for
not providing proper weights and measures).
182. IRELAND, supra note 7, at 2-3 (noting patronage powers were restored with the new
constitution of 1799).
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was cleared by the grand jury, examining court, or petty jury.183
Reluctant prosecutors at the county level were outgunned by more
competent and better-prepared defense attorneys. 184 Assaults fre-
quently resulted in penny fines; thefts were seldom prosecuted and
almost never resulted in a conviction. 185
County jails that then existed were "leaky" arrangements with
little security. 186 Debtors were held with those accused of serious
crimes and those serving short sentences in jail.187 Some of those
accused of crimes were allowed to escape when the odds were slim
that they would ever reimburse the public treasury for the costs of
prosecution should they be convicted. 188 Those who did not escape
languished in jail for up to two years while their families became
impoverished, and witnesses died or disappeared. 189
The hardship of traveling to felony proceedings was even worse
for Kentuckians than for Virginians. Prior to the establishment of a
separate judicial district for Kentucky, "two hundred miles of moun-
tainous desert" stood between the Kentucky settlements and Rich-
183. Gratiot, supra note 11, at 260.
184. Robert M. Ireland, Law and Disorder in Nineteenth-Century Kentucky, 32 VAND. L.
REV. 281, 283-85 (1979) (noting that few wanted to serve as prosecutor in Kentucky and listing
reasons). One court explained:
To prevent vexatious prosecutions for petty misdemeanors, by those who would
willingly convert the process of the Commonwealth into an engine of malice and
private resentment, provided they could stand behind the curtain secure from costs, it
has been enacted among other things that "the name and surname of the prosecutor,
and the town and county in which he shall reside, with his title and profession, shall
be written at the foot... of every bill of indictment for any trespass or misdemeanor,
before it be presented to the grand jury .. " And it is further provided that the
prosecutor shall be subject to cost in case the prosecution is not effectual or the in-
dictee is in any matter acquitted.
Commonwealth v. Hutcheson, 4 Ky. (1 Bibb) 355 (1809) (citations omitted). This loser-pays
system for county prosecutors persisted well into the nineteenth century. See, e.g., Common-
wealth v. Gore, 33 Ky. (3 Dana) 474 (1835) (Peter C. Updike was "induced to become the
prosecutor . . . at the... request of Ross, the injured party," who said that "he never would
permit any person to suffer by being his friend" and "that he felt morally bound to pay [Updike]
any costs he might incur" as the result of a failed prosecution.); Commonwealth v. Cunningham,
15 Ky. (5 Litt.) 292 (1824) ( "Lest indictments of this kind should be made the ministers of
passion, and be used for vindictive purposes, it was thought expedient by the legislature to
subject them to some restrictions, one of which is, the subscribing the name of the prosecutor."
Security may be required, as well, so "that on the final judgment of acquittal, the prosecutor
should be subject to costs.").
185. Gratiot, supra note 11, at 319-27.
186. Id. at 286-89.
187. WILLIAM C. SNEED, A REPORT ON THE HISTORY AND MODE OF MANAGEMENT OF
THE KENTUCKY PENITENTIARY, FROM ITS ORIGIN, IN 1798, TO MARCH 1, 1860, at 149 (1860)
(noting that from 1792 to 1821, debtors could be imprisoned, but that after 1796, counties were
required to build county prisons for those who were not incarcerated in the penitentiary).
188. Gratiot, supra note 11, at 260.
189. Ireland, supra note 184, at 288.
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mond, where felony grand juries and jury trials were held.' 9° Much of
Kentucky was wilderness, a place where lawyers, like all frontier
residents, risked death in hostilities with Indians, robbery on the
roads, and piracy on the rivers. (The first, but not last, scalping of a
lawyer in Kentucky was reported in 1783.) 191 Only the hardiest of
victims, witnesses, and jurors would consider it worthwhile to make
this sort of journey in order to secure a guilty verdict. The establish-
ment of a felony court in the District of Kentucky in 1783192 reduced
the distance somewhat, but for most Kentuckians, until circuit courts
were created closer to home in 1802,193 the trip to the sole court with
felony jurisdiction could be prohibitively expensive.194
Qualified grand and petit jurors were sometimes difficult to find.
Trial juries were too often packed with defense sympathizers, and the
defendant's generous allotment of peremptory challenges assisted in
securing favorable juries. 195 Historian Robert Ireland tells of one
defendant who bribed four juries in succession, each one unable to
agree on a verdict; the governor finally ordered the defendant re-
leased. 196
190. Gratiot, supra note 11, at 44.
191. STATEN, supra note 181, at 14-15; see also Gratiot, supra note 11, at 13-14, 278-79
(noting that robbery was committed on long roads between towns over unsettled land, travelers
were shot dead for their money, and pirates robbed those on the Ohio River).
192. WILLIAM C. RICHARDSON, AN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF KENTUCKY COURTS
TO 1850, at 5-6 (1983) (citing statutes); Beckner, supra note 177, at 12-13; William E. Bivin, The
Historical Development of the Kentucky Courts, 47 KY. L.J. 465, 473 (1959) (noting that even
though there were six districts, each with a judge and each granted criminal jurisdiction by the
1795 constitution, criminal cases were held only in Frankfort because of inadequate district
jails). The first district court was held in Harrodsburg, and then later moved to Danville.
Gratiot, supra note 11, at 46. Later, all criminal jurisdiction was vested in the Frankfort District
due to "[tihe custom of conducting criminal trials in one place in order to insure the accused a
fair trial before the best judges available and by the best jurymen" and also to free the other
district courts to address other matters. Id. at 64. After the Circuit Court Act of 1802, cases
were cognizable in any circuit court. Id. at 91-98.
193. RICHARDSON, supra note 192, at 7, 12.
194. Gratiot explained:
Until the enactment of the Circuit Court law in 1802 the trek of the sheriff, venire and
witnesses from the county where the crime was committed to the place of trial was
both expensive and time consuming. The expense varied according to the distance and
the number of individuals making the trip. In 1793, the expenses of a venire, sheriff
and six witnesses traveling from Scott County to... Lexington amounted to seven
pounds, three shillings, and eight pence.
Gratiot, supra note 11, at 238-39. Costs for a trial entourage from Green County cost the
Commonwealth more than thirty-one pounds. Id. at 239.
195. Id. at 238-44 (also noting complaints by lawyers that sheriffs did not select proper
jurors and took bribes from interested veniremen, and that bystanders were idle and seldom
sober); see also Ireland, supra note 184, at 291 (noting that jury packing was widespread).
196. Ireland, supra note 184, at 291.
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Grants of clergy were generous.' 97 Pardons, too, were frequent, 98
though sometimes arriving at the last possible moment. In 1794, one
lucky fellow named Wilcox, convicted of passing counterfeit bank
notes, was wheeled under the gallows in a wagon before an audience
of thousands. He had just finished saying a tearful goodbye to his
family when "he rec'd his reprieve from the Governor, to the satisfac-
tion of many of the spectators, tho' not near all .... -199 Ireland found
that prosecutors in the 1800s rarely responded to pardon petitions, or
even knew who was petitioning for pardon,200 and that fines were
remitted by the governor so routinely that prosecutors complained
that they did not get enough income from fines to recoup their
costs.201 The situation made Kentucky a "paradise where [felons]
could carry on their nefarious operations with impunity.
'20 2
Understandably, some Kentuckians preferred to rely on what
justice they could muster close at hand, rather than suffering the
expense, delay, and uncertainty of formal legal proceedings. In
Jefferson County, three brothers who "resolved themselves into a
court" to try a "diminutive red-headed" runaway servant, concluded
that he was guilty and "ought to be hung" for robbing the three of
them, but instead of executing him, they returned him to his master.203
According to another historian, although the law allowed a defendant
to plead guilty and be sentenced by the court, few defendants exer-
197. Gratiot observes:
If the verdict was guilty the prisoner usually was remanded to jail to await the formal
pronouncement of sentence by the court on a date later during the term. When that
day arrived the defendant "was again led to the Bar in custody of the jailor" and the
judges asked him if he had "anything to say why the court should not now proceed to
give Judgment .... If the defendant had nothing to say the court proceeded to sen-
tence him to hang if he had been convicted of a non-clergyable felony. He was then
remanded to jail to await the date of execution. If the crime for which he was con-
victed was clergyable, he usually claimed benefit of clergy, was burned in the hand by
the jailor in the presence of the court, and discharged.
Gratiot, supra note 11, at 252-53.
198. Id. at 263.
199. Id. at 267.
200. Ireland, supra note 184, at 296 (noting that pardons were granted often to enable ex-
convicts to vote); see also SNEED, supra note 187, at 151-59 (Of all 324 prisoners admitted
during the years of 1800-1815, "[131] received executive clemency by pardon.... some after
serving only a short portion of their sentences, but the majority of them only a few days before
the expiration of the term of their sentences," which restored them to citizenship.).
201. This led the legislature to limit the governor's ability to remit fines. Ireland, supra note
184, at 294 (noting that before the new constitution of 1850, Kentucky governors spent most of
their time either appointing civil and military officers or pardoning criminals and remitting
fines).
202. Gratiot, supra note 11, at 44.
203. Beckner, supra note 177, at 10.
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cised this option.2- Certainly, demanding trial by jury in the district
court afforded a better chance of escaping punishment.
B. Penal Reform in 1798
The shift to discretionary terms of imprisonment, selected by ju-
ries, was less rocky than it had been in Virginia. Kentucky's first
proponent of penal reform was John Breckenridge, who was a
member of the Virginia House of Delegates in the early 1780s and
was yet another student of George Wythe at William & Mary. He
had moved to Kentucky in 1793, where he was elected to the new
state's legislature. 25 Breckenridge petitioned the legislature that year
asking that penalties be made proportionate to offenses. He argued
that "it was the certainty of punishment rather than the severity of
penalty which would serve as a deterrent to the commission of
crime," and that the legislature must "remedy a system which permit-
ted the forfeiture of human life for petty offenses," unjustified by
"'time, prescription or necessity. ''206
In 1793, the cause was taken up by Kentucky Attorney General
William Murray in his report to the Senate. He argued that the
failure to graduate penalties in proportion to the offenses was the key
flaw in Kentucky's criminal law, rendering it "contrary to humanity"
as well as "to justice and policy. ' 20m His appendix reportedly listed
eighty capital crimes then in force.2°8 Murray condemned these
capital penalties as irrational as well as disproportionate. Horse
stealing was a capital crime without benefit of clergy, but the theft of
cattle, sheep, or hogs, though triple in value, was clergyable. The
reformers could have accomplished certainty and moderation of
punishment with mandatory penalties, but the view that individual
204. Gratiot wrote:
[T]he writer has never encountered such an instance in any of the Kentucky re-
cords....
In the greater majority of criminal cases brought to trial in the Kentucky of this
period the accused entered a plea of not guilty and put himself "upon God and his
country." This meant that a jury would be impannelled to try the case.
Gratiot, supra note 11, at 237-38.
205. Paul Knepper, The Kentucky Penitentiary at Frankfort and the Origins of America's
First Convict Lease System, 1798-1843, 69 FILSON CLUB HiST. Q. 41, 44 (1995). This John
Breckenridge should not to be confused with his son or grandson, who were also well known
Kentuckians. See Gratiot, supra note 11, at 420-29.
206. Gratiot, supra note 11, at 424-25.
207. Id. at 426.
208. Gratiot, supra note 11, at 425. O.F. Lewis pegged the number of capital felonies at a
more modest twenty-six. See LEWIS, supra note 83, at 253.
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defendants may require different punishments even when they
commit the very same crime had taken hold. Murray, unlike
Breckenridge, argued that reformation of the offender should be one
of the aims of the state. Like Taylor in Virginia, he maintained that
shaming by public labor undermined reformation. Virtue could only
be restored to criminals by following a policy of confining them "to
solitary labor for times proportioned to their offences," a policy that
had proven successful in Pennsylvania.209
A significant barrier remained, holding up reform for several
more years. The gallows, pillory, branding iron, and whipping post
were cheap; building a secure penitentiary required revenue the state
did not have.210 It may have been this concern that led conservatives
in the state senate to allow the penal reform bill passed by the House
in 1794 to die. Three years later, after Virginia had succeeded in
reforming its penal law, the clamor for reform in Kentucky had grown
louder. One such expression occurred in a pardon petition on behalf
of one James Brown, who had been convicted and sentenced to death
for circulating ten pounds of counterfeit coins. In their petition, the
"sundry inhabitants of Mason county" hoped that the governor's
duties "would permit him to mitigate the rigour of the law which the
prejudices and imperfections of human nature have so far prevented
from being modeled on principles more moderate and humane. '211 In
1797, most of the petitions for the twelve souls facing capital punish-
ment who were pardoned by the governor had been signed by the
very judges who had imposed the sentences.212 In charging his grand
jury in October 1797, Judge Coburn urged the jurors to use their
influence among their fellow citizens to help create a sentiment more
favorable to reform and to ask their representatives in the Assembly
to pass a reform bill. 213 By the end of the year, the governor declared
to the legislature that "immediate revision" of the criminal law was
209. Gratiot, supra note 11, at 426. Writing under a pseudonym, "Aristides," Breckenridge
wrote to the Kentucky Gazette in 1794, calling attention to the alarming increase in crime: for
twelve years there had been a court of criminal jurisdiction, but the capital penalty for offenses
against property had been imposed in only two cases. "Experience had revealed that the
'current' of public opinion had to be 'strong' before a sufficient number of laymen could be
assembled to form a jury which would 'convict a man of an offense against property' involving
the death penalty." Aristides argued that Kentucky must follow Pennsylvania reforms. If it
could not afford it at that time, "money could be raised by loan or public subscription." Id. at
427-29.
210. Id. at 426-27.
211. Id. at 430.
212. Id. at 430-31 (five free persons, seven slaves).
213. Id. at 431.
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essential to remedy "the glaring disproportion we have established,
between punishments and crimes-a disproportion so disgusting to
humanity, and so derogatory from the honor of a republican govern-
ment."
214
In January 1798, reform finally succeeded. Breckenridge himself
was responsible for drafting the bill and securing its passage."'
Although the state had only about $7,000 set aside for construction of
the prison, he had found a way around the fiscal burden that the
switch to imprisonment would impose on the state. The bill was
designed to make imprisonment self-supporting.2 6  Breckenridge
argued that once the penitentiary was built and occupied, convicts
would receive instruction in trades, the party injured would receive
reparation determined by the jury in its verdict, and the state would
be reimbursed for its expense-the penitentiary would not be a
financial burden for the state. 2 7 The keeper's pay depended entirely
upon the net profits of the establishment, furnishing "the strongest
imaginable guarantee that the convicts should not become a burden
to the State. '218 He maintained that state outlays for the past three
years of prosecutions had been a total loss, with only rare executions
and a rising crime rate.2 19 Only after an unsuccessful attempt to
institute private subscriptions for the penitentiary did the act pass.
220
The dubious distinction of being the penitentiary's first prisoner fell
to John Turner, who was sentenced to serve two years for horse
stealing, and was admitted to the penitentiary on September 23,
1799.221
Kentucky's reform act of 1798, like Virginia's, deprived trial
judges of the discretionary power over the actual sentence, which
they had previously possessed. Breckenridge lifted the preamble to
Jefferson's proposed bill from 1779 for the preamble to the Kentucky
214. Id. at 432.
215. Gratiot, supra note 11, at 433.
216. LEWIS, supra note 83, at 253-54 ("Popular subscriptions of money or one acre of
land-which might be sold to bring in cash-were asked about the year 1796, with which to
build the prison.").
217. Knepper, supra note 205, at 44-46.
218. SNEED, supra note 187, at 181.
219. Gratiot, supra note 11, at 435-36.
220. COWARD, supra note 176, at 84-85 (calling penal reform a "tug-of-war between
idealism and economy" and noting that "[flor three subsequent legislative sessions, the General
Assembly wrangled over the amount to appropriate for the building and the jailer's salary").
221. SNEED, supra note 187, at 26-28 (quoting judgment for the first convict admitted to the
penitentiary, signed by Judge Coburn of the Lexington District Court, and noting that the
keeper was paid for boarding Turner from Sept. 23 to Dec. 23, 1799).
HeinOnline  -- 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
 981 2003
CHICA GO-KENT LAW REVIEW
act.222 Kentucky's act, like Virginia's, abolished clergy and provided
that the "jury before whom any offender may be tried, shall decide
upon, and in their verdict ascertain the time within their respective
periods prescribed, during which such offenders shall undergo
confinement in the jail and penitentiary house herein after men-
tioned, according to the directions of this act. '23  "Since the jury
decided what the sentence should be in each case, there was no
opportunity for the trial judge to exercise any arbitrary authority with
respect to the sentence itself.
2 4
C. Why Juries and Not Judges?
Kentucky's shift to jury sentencing in felony cases is in two re-
spects less mysterious than Virginia's. First, Kentucky's lawmakers
naturally looked to Virginia's innovation in sentencing as a model for
their own sentencing statute, just as they did in other areas of the
law.2 5  No evidence has been uncovered indicating that they ever
considered a judge sentencing scheme. Second, both before and after
Breckenridge's bill was passed, Kentuckians departed from Virginia's
law or practice in ways that suggested that the distrust of judges was
more pronounced in Kentucky than it was in the Old Dominion.
Specifically, the contradictory pockets of judicial sentencing
power that persisted in Virginia were not found in Kentucky. Special
verdicts by which the juries would leave a defendant's fate to the
bench, frequently used in Virginia, were authorized but rarely used in
222. Id. at 18.
223. TOULMIN, supra note 180, at 350 (Act of Act of Dec. 20, 1800, § 15).
224. Gratiot, supra note 11, at 195. Sentences were provided as follows: Treason, 6-12
years; arson, 5-12 years; rape, 4-12 years; sodomy 2-5 years; second-degree murder, 5-18 years;
robbery or burglary, restitution plus 3-10 years; horse stealing, restore animal or value and 2-7
years; larceny over $4, restitution plus 1-3 years; forgery, 4-15 years and fine not exceeding
$1000 as determined by the court; maiming, 2-10 years and fine not exceeding one thousand
(3(4 of which is to be paid to the victim). Id. at app. C.
Not until December 1801 did the legislature appoint a committee of revisors to codify the
laws of Kentucky. 1 TOUMLIN & BLAIR, supra note 179, at ix. In 1804 a three-volume "review
of the criminal law" by Toumlin and Blair was published "under the authority of the Legisla-
ture."
225. Gratiot, supra note 11, at 436-37 (noting that "it is impossible to discover whether the
opposition to the new act was strong"); see also Paul Knepper, Thomas Jefferson, Criminal Code
Reform, and the Founding of the Kentucky Penitentiary at Frankfort, 91 REG. KY. HIST. SOC'Y
129, 135-38 (1993); Gratiot, supra note 11, at 433 ("Neither the Breckinridge nor the Jefferson
Papers in the Library of Congress throw any light on the influence Jefferson might have exerted,
although it is certain that they were corresponding during this period.").
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Kentucky.226 In 1830, these verdicts were condemned by Kentucky's
high court. 227 After 1819 repeat offenders were sentenced in Virginia
at the discretion of the judge. In Kentucky they faced either manda-
tory terms, leaving no discretion for the judge, or sentencing by
jury.228 A thief who stole a second time was to receive a term of
incarceration twice as long as he had received for his first offense, but
only after a jury had found in its verdict what his first sentence had
been.229 A hog-stealer who repeated his crime was sentenced at the
discretion of the jury, from six months to three years.
230
In Kentucky, but not in Virginia, slaves as well as free blacks
were tried and sentenced by juries.231 Kentucky juries, not judges,
selected the amount of restitution owed a victim of a felony, while in
Virginia judges fixed restitution.232 Even prison discipline was dis-
pensed by juries in Kentucky, with the law calling for inmates of the
penitentiary who quarreled with each other to "suffer such punish-
226. Gratiot, supra note 11, at 255 (noting that although the jury could return a special
verdict stating facts but leaving to the court the conclusions of law to be drawn from those facts,
this sort of verdict was rarely returned).
227. See Montee v. Commonwealth, 26 Ky, (3 J.J. Marsh.) 132, 151 (1830).
228. TOUMLIN, supra note 180, at 352 (Act of Act of Dec. 20, 1800, § 24).
229. R.S. ROSE, 2 KENTUCKY CRIMINAL LAW PROCEDURE AND FORMS 1336, § 2061
(1918):
On the trial of an indictment for larceny, where former convictions are also alleged,
the defendant is not entitled to a separate finding on the guilt or innocence of the main
charge, but the jury should be required to find, under appropriate instructions, the fact
of former convictions, and fix the increased penalty.... [The jury] should in their
verdict say for what period of time [defendant] was so sentenced to confinement in the
penitentiary.
Section 1130, providing double punishment for a second conviction, required jury to fix
punishment. See also In re Channels, 100 S.W. 214, 214 (Ky. 1907).
230. 1 TOUMLIN & BLAIR, supra note 179, at 292 (quoting Act of 1801, § 17).
231. Doram v. Commonwealth, 31 Ky. (1 Dana) 331 (1832) (The court held, in the case of a
free black defendant, that "the act of 1808 should be interpreted as dispensing with a jury; and
therefore it... conflicts with the supreme law of the land" guaranteeing the accused "trial by an
impartial JURY of the vicinage."); Id. ("A free man cannot be sold, even for an instant, unless a
jury of his peers shall have passed condemnation upon him."); Flanagan, supra note 118, at 545
("Kentucky slaves had the right to a jury trial .... ). Although both the free and enslaved
blacks were afforded juries, slaves did not benefit from the revised penalties in the act of 1798.
They suffered under the same double standard as in Virginia. Lucius Little observed:
The punishment of slaves for penal offenses and crimes was limited to death and
stripes. For various offenses for which white offenders were confined in the peniten-
tiary the slave was punished at the whipping-post; while as to other crimes by white
persons for which the punishment was also penal confinement the slave suffered
death.
Little, supra note 175, at 37.
232. Gratiot, supra note 11, at 271 (noting that an 1805 statute settled that when a defendant
was convicted and sentenced for theft, the trial judge was not free to decree an award of
restitution, but instead, questions of fact were to be decided by a jury, and the jury was to
determine value of any property in question).
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ment (within the prison) as should be awarded by an impartial jury,
but not over four lashes or 10 hours of solitary confinement. ' '233 The
provision that gave Virginia judges the discretion to set sentences in
cases of confession did not exist in Kentucky. Perhaps most telling of
all, magistrates in Kentucky had no discretionary sentencing authority
in minor crimes, as they did in Virginia. It was the county jury that
selected a misdemeanant's sentence when the penalty was not manda-
tory, both before and after the reform act of 1798.234  Eventually,
Kentucky shifted from a judiciary appointed by the governor131 to one
elected by the people, 236 while Virginia has remained to this day one
of the few southern states without popular judicial elections23 7
It is not entirely clear what accounts for this heightened wariness
of the bench in Kentucky.2 38 It could simply have been a response to
poor and corrupt judges. One judge of the court of appeals in 1806
confessed that he had for years been on Spain's payroll in connection
with navigation of the Mississippi, a treasonous association.239 As in
Virginia, some magistrates simply ignored their duties. Robert
Ireland notes that this problem became more acute in the second half
233. LEWIS, supra note 83 at 255.
234. For example, the punishment for selling a vote for any office was amercement and
imprisonment at the discretion of a jury; those convicted of riots and routs could be jailed "for
so long a time as shall be limited by a jury, and have paid such amercement as the same jury
shall assess"; "going with force and arms before courts" led to fines and imprisonment at the
discretion of a jury; altering brands was fined at the discretion of a jury up to fifty pounds and
imprisoned for up to six months. TOULMIN, supra note 180, at 369-73 (Act of Dec. 19, 1801, §§
28, 32, 33, 37); see also Commonwealth v. Watkins, 6 Ky. (3 Bibb) 21, 22 (1813) ("[l]n all cases
where the penalty imposed shall exceed five pounds, or shall be uncertain, the trial shall be by
jury, who shall find the amount of the penalty or forfeiture incurred.") (emphasis added).
235. Bivin, supra note 192, at 474-75 (noting that the constitution of 1799 created a court
system with judges appointed for life).
236. The 1849 constitution provided for popular election of judges. HISTORICAL DEVELOP-
MENT, supra note 177, at 19.
237. Supra note 174 and accompanying text. There is little doubt that if the people of
Kentucky distrusted judges, their opinions would be clearly understood by their assemblymen.
Kentuckians in the 1790s were capable of expressing their political views with unmistakable
passion. An apt illustration took place in the state's capitol during that period. Frankfort
residents, angry that their United States Senator, Thomas Marshall, had voted for Jay's treaty in
late 1794,
undertook to duck him in the Kentucky river. They had him at the water's edge and
were about to put him under, when he suggested that it was customary always to
allow the candidate for baptism to relate his experience; and he claimed the privilege.
The humor of the request struck the crowd, and they gave the senator a hearing. His
address was so powerful that one by one his persecutors slipped away and allowed
him to return to his home in peace!
Beckner, supra note 177, at 17.
238. COWARD, supra note 176, at 153-57 (reporting vehement and intense antijudiciary
feelings in the state legislature from 1797 to 1799).
239. Beckner, supra note 177, at 14.
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of the nineteenth century. He writes that one judge reportedly told
the residents of one county to "go to hell" and never held court at
all.240 (The legislature attempted to penalize judges who failed to hold
court in 1852 and again in 1881, but its efforts were struck down as
unconstitutional by other judges, not surprisingly.) Lay judges, in
particular, were considered by Kentuckians to be vulnerable to
manipulation and error.24
Alternatively, Kentucky's judges may have been no worse than
those in Virginia, or Pennsylvania for that matter. Instead, the
distrust of judges in Kentucky may have been an outgrowth of the
population's frontier mentality. In any event, the state stuck with its
choice of jury as sentencer. Directly after the penitentiary was built,
Kentucky's legislature, mindful of its investment, appointed a board
of inspectors for the institution. Only five years later, the board in its
report to the legislature took "the liberty of recommending to the
Legislature some changes in the law, which they conceive would
make the system more perfect. 2 42 Number six on this list was the
following: "That the time of confinement of a convict ought to be
vested with the court, and not with the jury, as heretofore, in order to
produce uniformity. ' 243 The board was not the only voice complain-
ing about jury sentencing in Kentucky at the time. Others lamented
that juries were too soft on criminals, and that they imposed sen-
tences that were too light. 2" Despite these complaints, even those
from the legislature's own appointed advisors, sentencing authority
has not been returned to the bench in Kentucky. It remains with the
jury today.
CONCLUSION
Several of the explanations that modern commentators on jury
sentencing have offered for the adoption of jury sentencing are not
supported by the findings here. Contrary to suggestions that jury
sentencing was adopted by states in their first criminal laws,245 Vir-
ginia for its first twenty years as a state allowed judges to exercise
what sentencing discretion there was in felony cases by granting or
240. Ireland, supra note 184, at 287.
241. Gratiot, supra note 11, at 196.
242. SNEED, supra note 187, at 54.
243. Id. at 55.
244. Ireland, supra note 184, at 294.
245. Adriaan Lanni, Note, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An Idea Whose Time Has
Come (Again)?, 108 YALE L.J. 1775, 1790-91 (1999).
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withholding the benefit of clergy. Kentucky did the same for nearly a
decade.
Nor was the adoption of jury sentencing for felony offenses a
simple story of preserving the power that jurors already wielded
through their verdicts of guilt or innocence prior to the establishment
of the penitentiary.246 Sentencing authority in these early states was
not held by the jury alone. Judges shared sentencing authority in
misdemeanor cases. And although jurors then, as today, would have
had de facto power to set the sentence by convicting or acquitting
when an offense carried a mandatory penalty, capital punishment for
felony offenses was not truly mandatory at all. Instead, judges had
the authority to extend the benefit of clergy to convicted felons, and
did so in a significant proportion of cases. Moreover, governors
routinely pardoned defendants who had been condemned to death.
Sentencing authority was the sum of legislated penalty, jury verdict,
clergy, and pardon. This was well understood by Thomas Jefferson
when he drafted his penal reform bill of 1779. He knew that changing
statutory penalties without also abolishing clergy and pardon would
leave what appeared to be certain punishment upon conviction as
uncertain as ever. The Pennsylvania legislature in 1786 understood
this, too, as it debated whether the exercise of sentencing discretion
should rest with the Executive Council in the form of pardon, with
judges, or with juries. The complex relationship between legislature,
jury, judge, and executive in sentencing was as real two hundred years
ago as it is today.2 47 The jury possessed de facto power to sentence
prior to penal reform in Virginia and Kentucky, but that power
coexisted with the explicit statutory power of judges and governors to
determine actual punishment.
It has also been suggested that juries were selected to impose
sentences because they were more likely to know the defendant and
better understand his capacity for reformation or criminality.
248
Jurors were supposed to be drawn from the vicinage of the crime, but
246. See, e.g., Iontcheva, supra note 2, at 323 (arguing that historically juries held sentencing
power through their verdicts of guilt and innocence: "More than factfinders, juries decided the
fate of the defendants they convicted.").
247. The pardoning power has perhaps declined more than the others, as evidenced by the
reaction of some to Governor Ryan's blanket commutation of death sentences in Illinois. "'I
think the state has a very strong argument that the governor was acting outside his power,' said
Alan Raphael, a capital appellate defender who teaches constitutional law at Loyola University
Chicago. 'It is the courts that sentence and not the governor."' Molly McDonough, Balance of
Power: Prosecutors Challenge Historic Commutation of171 Death Sentences, ABA J. EREPORT,
(Jan. 17, 2003) 6, at http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/j17challenge.html.
248. Iontcheva, supra note 2, at 317, 318-20.
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in practice bystanders often made up a significant portion, if not the
entirety, of the panel.249 Not only did bystanders supplement what-
ever veniremen could be imported from the place where the crime
was committed, but in Kentucky the defendant was often a stranger
even to that community. The Kentucky frontier was a place of new
arrivals, transients, and unknowns. Most of the offenders sentenced
to the Kentucky penitentiary during its first years were from out of
state.
25 0
Moreover, the origins of jury sentencing also appear unrelated to
any tendency to allow juries to decide issues of law.251 Other than the
ubiquitous authority to allow clearly guilty felons to walk away "scot-
free," law and fact finding were rigidly separated in Virginia and
Kentucky courts both before and after the penal reform acts that
granted juries the power to select terms of imprisonment in felony
cases.252 In Virginia, jurors themselves frequently declined to decide
questions of law, returning special verdicts so that judges could be the
arbiters of life and limb.
Jury sentencing in Virginia, and then in Kentucky, also did not
arise from mistrust of "Crown-appointed judges," as at least one
commentator has argued.25' Virginians and Kentuckians had been
functioning with American judges for some time before making the
shift to jury sentencing. If jury sentencing was perceived as protec-
tion for citizens against judicial power in felony cases, it shielded
them from a new class of homegrown jurists trained in American law
by American lawyers, and appointed to the bench by their own
elected officials.
The legislative choice of jury or judge as sentencer in Pennsyl-
vania, Virginia, and Kentucky appears to have turned at least partly
upon factors other than the relative merits of judges and juries as
reliable assessors of punishment. In Pennsylvania, what debate there
249. Compare supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text, with MILLER, supra note 6, at 30
(describing Virginia district court juries in Prince Edward County and concluding that "it was a
justice of familiarity, where the judges, the grand and petit jury members, the attorneys, and the
litigants all knew each other").
250. SNEED, supra note 187, at 224 (stating that in 1830, Kentucky having been just recently
settled, only twenty-four of the state's ninety prisoners were native Kentuckians); see also
LEWIS, supra note 83, at 253.
251. Iontcheva, supra note 2, at 319-23.
252. ROEBER, supra note 6, at 167-73. Also note the majority opinion, later withdrawn for
lack of jurisdiction, in Commonwealth v. Garth, 30 Va. (3 Leigh) 761 (1827).
253. Iontcheva, supra note 2, at 316-17; see also Note, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, 53 VA. L.
REV. 968, 970 (1967) (attributing the empowerment of juries in the early states to bitter
experience with English and colonial judges).
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was over sentencing authority reflected the power struggles between
the two parties controlling the legislature at the time. Republican
forces in the Pennsylvania legislature who distrusted the Constitu-
tionalists on the bench were not powerful enough to block the delega-
tion of new sentencing authority to judges. In order to deny their
enemies sentencing power, jury sentencing was floated by the Repub-
licans as one of several options, but it never had a realistic chance of
success. Politics, too, may have played a role in Virginia, where the
bill granting juries the power to sentence was championed by a
Federalist, who had little reason to be wary of elitist judges in the
abstract (becoming one later himself), but who could well have
distrusted the many Republicans who served on Virginia's district
court bench at the time. Indeed, Virginia law did not reflect a rejec-
tion of judge as sentencer per se. Virginians were quite content to
allow judges rather than juries to determine punishment in a number
of ways inconsistent with a strong preference for the democratic
judgment of a jury over the professional decisions of the judiciary.
Kentucky's experience suggests that settlement patterns and legal
heritage were prime determinants of that state's sentencing policy, as
its preference for jury over judge sentencing was lifted from Virginia
law by the new state's lawyers, most of whom were steeped in Vir-
ginia's legal traditions.
Given this relatively untidy history, one should at least be hesi-
tant to assume that legislators in states adopting jury sentencing after
1796 first considered carefully the pros and cons of placing sentencing
power in the hands of the jury rather than in the hands of the judge,
and then deliberately chose jury sentencing for its greater democratic
potential. It is of course possible that a popular democratic spirit
motivated the choice of jury over judge in these later states, but it is
also possible that, as in Pennsylvania, political power struggles
between the party with control of the bench and its rivals may have
determined the choice. It is also possible that legislators may have
merely replicated for their new states the sentencing system they
knew the best without seriously considering other options, Kentucki-
ans copying Virginia law providing a probable example. Indeed, the
narrow westward path that jury sentencing carved across the nation
suggests that the jury sentencing model followed Virginia-trained
lawyers and the settlers they influenced, while in the North, the
Pennsylvania system became the norm. These and other hypotheses
must await further research. Only detailed exploration of the legisla-
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tive history of the jury sentencing provisions adopted later in other
states will reveal just how and why felony jury sentencing developed
after its emergence in Virginia and Kentucky more than two centuries
ago.
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APPENDIX: SENTENCING AUTHORITY FOR SELECTED STATES**
Alabama: Alabama adopted jury sentencing in a limited form.
Its code of 1807 followed the common-law rule of allowing juries to
set fines but not imprisonment. The state legislature soon allowed the
jury to set, in addition to fines, the term of imprisonment for man-
slaughter but not for other felonies. 24 By 1841, Alabama had built its
state penitentiary and had revised its criminal code.255 The new code
specified that juries would set fines, the jail terms for some specified
misdemeanors, and penitentiary terms for a handful of non-capital
felonies (circulating incendiary papers; destruction of property;
second-degree murder; lynching; harboring runaway slaves; conceal-
ing slaves guilty of capital offenses; counterfeiting). Section 20 of the
1841 act provided that "in all cases the court shall prescribe the term
of imprisonment both in the penitentiary and county jail, unless it
shall be expressly directed otherwise." The state eventually added
several crimes to the list of crimes subject to jury sentencing.256
** This list does not include all of the states that adopted judge sentencing with discre-
tionary terms of imprisonment, such as Rhode Island, Delaware, Massachusetts, and Mississippi,
nor states that adopted jury sentencing later on in the nineteenth century, including Texas,
Indiana, Illinois, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and West Virginia. West Virginia, in particular, is often
overlooked in the litany of states with jury sentencing at some point in their history. West
Virginia, like Kentucky, grew out of the Virginia legal tradition and used jury sentencing for
several decades. For cases illustrating jury sentencing from West Virginia, see, for example,
State v. Cain, 20 W. Va. 679 (1882) (fourteen years for second degree murder); State v. Sites, 20
W. Va. 13 (1882) (two years for breaking and entering); State v. Conners, 20 W. Va. 1 (1882)
(five years for grand larceny); State v. Meadows, 18 W. Va. 658, 660 (1881) (quoting statute
providing that for assault without malicious intent, the offender, "shall at the discretion of the
jury either be confined in the penitentiary not less than one nor more than five years or be
confined in jail not exceeding twelve months and fined not exceeding $500.00"); State v. Hurst,
11 W. Va. 54 (1877) (quoting statute providing that incarceration term for false pretenses be set
by jury be from one to five years); Lemons v. State, 4 W. Va. 755 (1870) (two years for horse
theft); Bales v. State, 3 W. Va. 685 (1868) (one year for larceny); Moody v. State, 1 W. Va. 337
(1866) (jury set five-year term for robbery).
254. See Hawkins v. State, 3 Stew. & P. 63 (Ala. 1832).
255. An Act Regulating Punishments under the Penitentiary System, 1841; Hilda Jane
Zimmerman, Penal Systems and Penal Reforms in the South Since the Civil War 21 (1947)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina) (on file with author).
256. See Phillips v. State, 130 So. 2d 822 (Ala. 1961) (robbery); Gregory v. State, 180 So. 562
(Ala. 1938) (carnal knowledge of girl); Weatherford v. State, 43 Ala. 319 (1869) (rape); Turner
v. State, 40 Ala. 21 (1866) (horse theft); Holloway v. State, 182 So. 2d 906 (Ala. Ct. App. 1965 )
(carnal knowledge of girl); Shorty v. State, 152 So. 267 (Ala. Ct. App. 1934) (robbery); Franklin
v. State, 92 So. 526 (Ala. Ct. App. 1922) (carnal knowledge of girl).
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Judges set terms of imprisonment for other offenses.57 What jury
sentencing there was in Alabama was abandoned with the new
criminal code of 1975, effective in 1980.258
Connecticut: Imprisonment in Connecticut was not centralized
until the state's prison was rebuilt in 1790.259 Judges, not juries,
selected incarceration terms under the state's criminal code of 1790.
260
Georgia: The Georgia penitentiary opened in 1816 with the
adoption of a new penal code imposing discretionary terms of impris-
onment. The code provided that judges set jail sentences, but for
most offenses penitentiary terms were set "as the jury may recom-
mend. '261 With the adoption of indeterminate sentencing in 1937,
jury sentencing was suspended. 262 Judge sentencing lasted only a year,
for the legislature provided in March 1939 that juries were to pre-
scribe minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment in their verdict
and that the judge shall commit the defendant "in accordance with
the verdict of the jury. '263 Georgia abandoned jury sentencing in
1974.2
64
Maryland: Maryland, like Pennsylvania, experimented with sub-
stituting public labor for capital punishment for some felonies in 1789.
When Maryland eventually did build a penitentiary, opened in 1811,
the new Penitentiary Act of 1809 eliminated capital punishment for
many offenses and gave judges wide discretion to sentence felons to
either hanging or prison.
265
257. Freeman v. State, 44 So. 46 (Ala. 1907) (assault and battery); Ellis v. State, 42 Ala. 525
(1868) (adultery between a white and a negro); Isbell v. State, 304 So. 2d 904 (Ala. Crim. App.
1974) (drug offenses); Caldwell v. State, 23 So. 2d 876 (Ala. Ct. App. 1945) (resisting arrest).
258. See ALA. R. CRIM. P. 26.6 comm. cmts.
259. ADAM J. HIRSCH, THE RISE OF THE PENITENTIARY 56 (1992).
260. See Act... for the punishment of certain atrocious Crimes and Felonies, Conn. 1790, at
393 (providing terms to be set "at the Discretion of the Court"); see also State v. Smith, 5 Day
175 (Conn. 1811) (judge imposed sentence for counterfeiting); State v. Farrand, 1 Root 446
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1792) (judge imposed sentence for robbery).
261. Act of Dec. 19, 1816, 1 Nov./Dec. 1816 Ga. Acts 27; see also Act of Dec. 14, 1811, 1
Nov./Dec. 1811 Ga. Acts 26 (granting judges the discretion to set terms of imprisonment for
many offenses, and retaining capital punishment and benefit of clergy for others). For a
searchable digital library of Georgia legislation from 1799, see http://dlg.Galileo.usg.edu.
262. Act of Feb. 16, 1938, 2 1937-38 Ga. Acts 326.
263. Act of March 24, 1939, § 3, 1 1939 Ga. Acts 285,287.
264. Act of March 20, 1974, 11974 Ga. Acts 352.
265. Laws of Maryland, 1809, ch. 138, §§ 3-6; James D. Rice, Crime and Punishment in
Frederick County and Maryland, 1748-1837: A Study in Culture, Society, and Law 388-409
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New Jersey: New Jersey's new criminal code of 1796 authorized
its first prison, constructed in 1798.166 The new state code abolished
clergy and imposed terms of imprisonment for most felonies, but
retained the death penalty for treason, petit treason, a second offense
of manslaughter, sodomy, rape, arson, burglary, robbery, forgery,
permitting a capital prisoner to escape, and aiding in the rescue of a
capital prisoner.267 Judges were given sentencing authority to select
terms of imprisonment.268
New York: New York substituted solitary confinement and hard
labor for capital punishment for most felonies in March 1796 and
completed Newgate prison on the east bank of the Hudson River in
1797.269
North Carolina: North Carolina, like South Carolina and Flor-
ida, did not build its first penitentiary until after the Civil War.270 The
state's 1868 constitution limited the death penalty to murder, arson,
burglary, and rape, and directed that a penitentiary be erected.271 In
1870 a site was purchased in Raleigh, and by 1873 state law provided
for terms of imprisonment for rape, sodomy, and other crimes for-
merly punished by death.272 These sentences were at the discretion of
the judge.273
(1994) (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation History, University of Maryland); see also Sawyer, supra
note 46, at 66-67 (summarizing Maryland's reform provisions).
266. See LEWIS, supra note 83, at 189.
267. See Edward Devine et al., Special Project: The Constitutionality of the Death Penalty in
New Jersey, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 261, 269-70 (1984) (providing an historical analysis of the
evolution of death penalty statutes in New Jersey).
268. See Act of March 18, 1796, § 72,1796 N.J. Laws 92; see also State v. Zellers, 7 N.J.L. 220
(N.J. 1824) (manslaughter); State v. Van Houten, 3 N.J.L. 700 (1810) (counterfeiting).
269. Lewis, supra note 83, at 43; see generally W. DAVID LEWIS, FROM NEWGATE TO
DANNEMORA: THE RISE OF THE PENITENTIARY IN NEW YORK, 1796-1848 (1965).
270. W. ALFRED COOKE, CALEDONIA: FROM ANTEBELLUM PLANTATION 1713-1892 TO
STATE PRISON AND FARM 1892-1988, at 31-33 (1988) (quoting First Annual Report of the
North Carolina Board of Public Charities, 1870); BLAKE MCKELVEY, AMERICAN PRISONS: A
HISTORY OF GOOD INTENTIONS 6-47 (1977); Zimmerman, supra note 255, at 54-59.
271. See Darnell F. Hawkins, State Versus County: Prison Policy and Conflicts of Interest in
North Carolina, in V CRIMINAL JUSTICE HISTORY 91,124 n.12 & 15 (1984) (citing N.C. CONST.
art. XI, § 3 (1868)).
272. Public Statutes of N.C. 1873 (Battle's Revisal) ch. 32.
273. See, e.g., id. § 17 (horse stealing, "shall suffer imprisonment at hard labor for not less
than five, nor more than twenty years, at the discretion of the Judge"); id. §§ 21-22 (felonies for
which no punishment is prescribed that were not allowed benefit of clergy shall be imprisoned
at the discretion of the court, not exceeding two years); id. ch. 33, § 123 ("In case a trial by jury
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South Carolina: South Carolina did not build its penitentiary un-
til after the Civil War.274  Branding and pillory were abolished by
1833. Whipping and jailing continued through the Civil War for
misdemeanants, while whipping and capital punishment remained the
penalty for felonies.275  The state substituted imprisonment for
corporal punishment in 1866, delegating sentencing authority to the
judge. 276
Tennessee: Replacing its criminal code of 1807, which prescribed
death or clergy, whipping, pillory, jail terms, restitution, forfeiture,
and fines, Tennessee in 1829 adopted discretionary terms of impris-
onment set by juries, and opened its penitentiary in 1831.277 As in
Georgia, jury sentencing in Tennessee had a hiatus shortly after the
adoption of indeterminate sentencing, between 1913 and 1923 .
Jury sentencing was then permanently replaced by judge sentencing
in 1982 with the passage of the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing
Reform Act of 1982, also known as the "judge sentencing law.,
279
shall be had, the justice shall submit to the jury in each case simply the question of the guilt or
innocence of the accused of the offence charged ... ").
274. Opponents of reform had argued that the penitentiary was too expensive, and
associated penal reform with abolitionism and Unionism. MICHAEL STEPHEN HINDUS, PRISON
AND PLANTATION: CRIME, JUSTICE, AND AUTHORITY IN MASSACHUSETTS AND SOUTH
CAROLINA, 1767-1878, at 216-19 (1980).
275. Williams, supra note 81, at 232, 246-54, 264.
276. Act of Dec. 21, 1866, 13 Stats. of S.C. 405; JACK KENNY. WILLIAMS, VOGUES IN
VILLAINY: CRIME AND RETRIBUTION IN ANTEBELLUM SOUTH CAROLINA (1959); John
Charles Thomas, The Development of "An Institution": The Establishment and First Years of
the South Carolina Penitentiary, 1795-1881 (1983) (unpublished masters thesis, University of
South Carolina) (on file with author).
277. Tenn. Public Acts of 1829, ch. 23, §§ 27, 76; Zimmerman, supra note 255, at 20.
278. DAVID L. RAYBIN, 11 TENNESSEE PRACTICE, CRIMINAL PRAcTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 32.2, at 177 (1985).
279. See TENN. R. CRIM. P. 32, cmt. to 1984 amend.; T.C.A. § 40-35-101; 11 THOMAS
EDWARD NELSON, JUDGE SENTENCING IN TENNESSEE, at x (1986); RAYBIN, supra note 278, at
175-78; Gary Shockley, A History of the Incarceration of Juveniles in Tennessee, 1796-1970, 43
TENN. HIST. Q. 229, 231 (1984).
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